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Abstract

Image processing is of growing interest in computer applications. Since the size of image
files are generally large and image data is usually highly redundant, using compression
algorithms provide effective way of increasing communication and storages efficiency.
JPEG, which is one of the most widely used image compression standards, uses Huffman or arithmetic coding for its lossless compression part. With rapid growth of the
Internet, controlling access to data is of increasing importance and hence encryption
is of much wider use. Adding security to the algorithm is an attractive proposal as it
could reduce the overall processing cost of providing secure compressed data.
A number of methods for combining encryption and compression had been proposed
and various attacks on these proposals were published. This thesis reviews the known
proposals for arithmetic coding encryption schemes and examines proposed attacks on
such systems. We extend the attacks, introduce new ones, and finally propose efficient
methods of enhancing security of these systems.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Image processing is of growing interest in computer applications. In publishing fields,
computerized desktop publishing is commonly used and due to the attractiveness of
the visual presentations, digital images are widely used on the World Wide Web. High
performance computers have become more affordable and multimedia applications are
in great demand. Since the required file sizes for images are generally much larger
than that of texts, data compression is of high importance for enabling efficient use of
storage and communication channels for digital images.

1.1

Motivation

To provide digital images usable in many applications, several standards are proposed.
JPEG (Joint Photographic Experts Group) standard, officially Recommendation T.81
by CCITT, is one of the most widely used standards [ITU93]. It provides the specifications of processes for the conversion between source image data and compressed
image data, and the specification of coded representations for compressed image data
and the guidelines of implementation of the processes. It uses two different classes of
compression. That is, lossy and lossless compression. In JPEG, the lossless compression follows the lossy compression, which uses DOT (Descrete Cosine Transform). For
the lossless compression, JPEG specifies Huffman and arithmetic coding as its entropy
encoder(decoder) to compress(decompress) the DOT coefficients.
Arithmetic coding is an optimal data compression algorithm originally proposed by
Pasco and Rissanen [BWC90]. Arithmetic coding encodes a message into a bit string,
which represents a real number interval in the interval [0,1) [BWC90].

Arithmetic

coding provides a flexible alternative to the commonly used Huffman compression algorithm and in many applications gradually replaces the latter.
Encryption algorithms protect data against unauthorized access. With rapid growth
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of the Internet, controlling access to data is of increasing importance and hence encryption is of much wider use. Digital images are no exception. It can be proved (Section
2.3.5) that compressing plaintext before applying the encryption algorithm effectively
increases the security of the overall system. If a data compression algorithm can be
made to also provide security, less processing overhead could be expected as a single
algorithm achieves two goals.
Witten and Cleary proposed a number of methods for combining encryption and
compression [WC88]. Subsequently various attacks on their proposals were published
which clearly showed the need for careful security assessment of any such proposal.
The results also showed that obtaining security without sacrificing compression ratio
and processing speed is not an easy task.

1.2

Objective

Our objective is to investigate compression-encryption schemes applied to digital images.

The question addressed in this research is whether it is possible to increase

efficiency, measured in terms of the processing time, by integrating the two processes.
Our research concentrates on arithmetic encoding encryption schemes.
It is worth noting that such combination will only be successful if the resulting
system i) does not considerably reduce compression rate, ii) requires less processing
time than direct compression followed by encryption and in) can provide demonstrable
security.

1.3

Contributions and structure of the thesis

In this thesis we extend some of the existing attacks to make them more efficient and
practical and then show new attacks on other variations of arithmetic coding encryption
schemes. One group of extensions are with regard to determining halving points^ the
point where the frequencies of the symbols in the model are halved and play a crucial
role in Bergen/Hogan attack (BH attack for short)[BH93]. We demonstrate efficient
ways of detecting the halving point by observing the output of the encoder. We also
show various methods of determining ihe. range when the model is known. The methods
are efficient and in one case the number of possible values for range is reduced to two.
Finally we give a summary of common weak points of arithmetic coding encryption
schemes and propose methods of strengthening the system.

1.3. Contributions and structure of the thesis

The thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we give an overview of information theory, data compression and security, and then describe details of how arithmetic
coding works. In Chapter 3, we look at arithmetic encoding encryption schemes, and
review the known attacks on arithmetic coding encryption schemes. In Chapter 4, we
demonstrate various new attacks on arithmetic coding encryption schemes. In Chapter
5, we look at weaknesses of arithmetic coding encryption schemes and propose protections against the attacks. In Chapter 6, we comment on the combined compression
and encryption scheme proposed in Chapter 5. Finally in Chapter 7 we summarize our
results.

1.4.

Notations

1.4

Notations

MSB

the most significant bit

LSB

the least significant bit

MSBs

the most significant bits

LSBs

the least significant bits
a symbol

ip[i

a symbol at the

position from the top of the frequency table

the ith input symbol (in a message)
V'max

a symbol at the top of the frequency table

V'min

a symbol at the bottom of the frequency table excluding the EOF symbol
(note: the EOF symbol is at the very bottom of the table)

Naymbol

the number of symbols

Pi,

the probability of a symbol ip

ClW

the lower cumulative probability of a symbol ip

ChW

the upper cumulative probability of a symbol Tp

FW

the frequency of a symbol ip

F(V'nxax)

the frequency of a symbol i/'max

F

the maximum frequency of a symbol i/'max when C/i(V'max) = C'max and all
other frequencies are 1
max

the maximum cumulative frequency (When C/(V'max) reaches Cmax, all
frequencies are halved.)

^max

the lower cumulative frequency of a symbol ip

CiW

the upper cumulative frequency of a symbol ip

ChW

the high value at the beginning of the encoding procedure of ith symbol

hi

the low value at the beginning of the encoding procedure of ith symbol

U

the MSBs of the high and low values which are the same

Mi
0

the order of a model

Si(x,u)

the shift function for the output procedure of a coder where i G {0,1}

01

the ith output of a coder

u

the output size (for a symbol)

Chapter 2
Arithmetic coding
In this chapter we examine arithmetic coding and its implementations.

Firstly, we

briefly review the information theory, data compression systems and security. Next,
we examine arithmetic coding scheme, outline various implementations and describe
one implementation in detail.

2.1

Information theory

Communication system
A communication system^ Fig. 2.1, consists of a message source, an encoder, a channel,
and a decoder. The message source produces messages to be transmitted. The encoder
performs source coding, which is to convert the messages into a form suitable for the
transmission. The channel is the medium through which the encoded messages are
transmitted. The noise may interfere with the communication over the channel. The
decoder recovers the encoded messages to their original form for the receiver of the
information.

Figure 2.1: Communication system

Uncertainty and entropy
Information is related to uncertainty. In a communication system, a message is transmitted from an information source. In a discrete source, a message consists of symbols,
chosen from an alphabet set. When the source emits a message, a message is chosen

2.2. Data compression

from the set of all possible messages. Once a symbol is chosen, the uncertainty about
it is removed.
If the message source is modeled as a discrete random variable, uncertainty can be
measured as follows [BP82]. Let X denote a discrete random variable that takes values
1 < ^<

with probabilities p{xi). Then the average uncertainty is given by
FM(X) = - S . ^ i p ( n ) l 0 g p ( x i ) .

(2.1)

This is called entropy of the random variable.
H{X) can be interpreted as the average amount of information obtained after observing X .

For example, assume that in an experiment a fair die is rolled. Each

number appears with equal chance and so the probability of each number from 1 to
6 is p{X = 1)= p(X = 2)= p{X = S)= p(X = i)=

p{X = b)= p{X = 6) = I

Then H{X) is given by H{X) = - E f ^ i | l o g 2 | ^ - W 2 I « 2.58 bits. Before rolling
the die, the average uncertainty over the experiment is 2.58 bits. After the outcome
of the experiment is known 2.58 bits of information is obtained and the uncertainty is
removed.
When we have a pair of discrete random variables X G {2:1, X 2 , x m } s-nd Y G
{2/1,2/2, •••,2/l}J with joint probability distribution

1 <i < M and I < j < L,

the joint entropy of X and Y is given by
H{X,Y)

=

(2.2)

Joint entropy satisfies the condition H{X, Y) < H(X) + H{Y) with equality if and
only if X and Y are independent. The conditional entropy of X and Y is given by
H{Y\X)

=

and satisfies the condition H{Y\X)

(2.3)
< H{X) with equality if and only if X and Y are

independent.

2.2

Data compression

Data compression is an outgrowth of information theory. The aim of data compression
is to find a short description for a message source.
For a channel with a given capacity compressing messages results in a more efficient use of the channels. There are two types of compression algorithms : lossless
compression and lossy compression. Our purpose is to assess the security of arithmetic

2.2.
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coding so we only look at the lossless compressions. In lossless compression systems
the compressed data can be used to recover an exact replica of the source output. In
lossy compression only approximate form of the source output can be recovered.

2.2.1

Source coding

The information source may be continuous or discrete. In the former case the source
output can be represented by a continuous time signal while in the latter case, the
output is represented by a string of symbols from a finite set. In source coding the
encoder encodes the output produced by the source into a sequence of codewords. The
length of codewords may be fixed or variable. An example of a fixed length code is
ASCII code. Morse code is an example of a variable length code. By assigning shorter
codewords to more frequent symbols, a more efficient encoding is achieved.

2.2.2

Optimal codes

An optimal code is the most efficient code for a given message source.

Let the

source be represented by a discrete random variable, X , that takes value from the
set { x i , x 2 , ...JXM}- In source coding each symbol is encoded into a codeword, which is
a sequence of symbols from another alphabet set, A = {ai,a2)

Let the length

of the codeword for Xi be U. Assuming that the channel is noiseless, then the most
efficient code is the one that has minimum average codeword length.
(2.4)
An important property of a code is that it should be uniquely decodahle. A code is
uniquely decodable if any encoded string has a unique source string correspond to it.
A prefix code is a code such that no codeword is a prefix of any other codeword and
it is uniquely decodable. Kraft Inequality is a necessary and sufficient condition that
must be satisfied by a prefix code [Kra49]. For any prefix code over an alphabet A, the
Kraft inequality is :
< 1-

(2-5)

The relationship between the entropy and the average codeword length is
H{X)<hogD.

(2.6)

2.2. Data
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Equality holds if and only if ^(xi) = D'^^Wi

; in this case, H{X)

= llogD.

There

exist D-ary (alphabet consisting of D symbols) prefix codes which satisfy

logD -

- logD

(2.7)

•

The prefix code with the shortest average length is called optimal prefix code.

2.2.3

Constructions of optimal codes

HufFman code
A method of constructing an optimal prefix code is given by Huffman [Huf52]. Assume
we have a set of symbols X = {2:1,2:25

^m} with probabilities p(xi),p{x2)^

•••^pi^M),

and letp(xi) > ^>(2:2) > ... > p{xm)- Assume there are D symbols in the code alphabet.
Then the algorithm is as follows.
1. Combine D symbols with the smallest probabilities to construct a symbol a:M-i?4-i,...,M
with probability '^^M-D+iPi^i)^ ^^^ replace Xm-d+i, •••^^m by the new symbol.
Repeat the procedure until the number of symbols becomes D.
2. Assign a single codeword symbol to each symbol.
3. If there is any symbol obtained from combining D symbols, separate it to D
symbols and append each codeword symbol to the codeword assigned to the
combined symbol. Repeat the procedure until all original symbols are separated.
An example is shown in Fig 2.2. The symbol set is X = {1,2,3,4,5} with probabilities 0.25,0.25,0.2,0.15,0.15 respectively and D = 2.
C(X) X P(X)
01

1

0.25 \

/

10

2

0.25 \

po.25

11

3

0.2

000

4

0.15 0'

001

5

0.15 1'

^ / l^

.0.55 0

\
\

/^ 0 . 3

0

^0.45

^

0.25 0 n^ 0 . 2 5

^0.2

1'

Figure 2.2: Example of Huffman code

1

2.2.

Data

compression

Shannon-Fano-Elias coding
Shannon-Fano-Elias coding encodes source symbols using cumulative distribution to
assign codewords. It is not an optimal coding algorithm but forms the basis of arithmetic coding, to be discussed in Section 2.4, that is an optimal coding algorithm.
Let X be a set of source symbols, where X = { 1 , 2 , . . . , M } and the probabilities be
p{X)

= { p ( l ) , p ( 2 ) , . . . , p ( M ) } where p{x) > 0 for all x. Then the cumulative distri-

bution function F{X)
F{x)

is defined as F{x)

4-

=

=

We define a function F{X)

as

If we use binary representation for F{x) after the decimal

point, ie. removing 0., with the length l{x) = [log ^ 1 + 1 , we can construct a uniquely
decodable code. Shannon-Fano-Elias coding assigns an integral number of bits to each
codewords and in this way it differs from arithmetic coding, which will be discussed
later.
Ziv-Lempel code
A dictionary based compression is given by Ziv and Lempel [ZL78].

By parsing a

message, Ziv-Lempel coding partitions it into variable-length blocks and constructs a
dictionary for it. Let a message, X = (xi, X2,

^n)^ be constructed from an M symbol

alphabet. Then the first entry in the dictionary is Bi = (xi). Then the shortest prefix
B2 = {x2,..., Xi) of the sequence (2:25 •••'^n) is added to the dictionary and the procedure
is repeated. Each entry in the dictionary is referred to by a pair of integers (j, Xfc) in
such a way that x^ is the last symbol in Bi and Bj is the sequence obtained by removing
Xk from Bi. The codewords are given from the pair of integers by M j + Xk. Ziv-Lempel
code is a universal source coding^ which compresses data without the prior knowledge
of the source distribution.

2.2.4

Data compression models

Statistical compression systems such as Huffman and arithmetic coding can be divided
into two parts: a model part that predicts incoming symbols, and a coder part which
uses the information given by the model to encode the incoming symbols into an
output sequence. If a model is fixed throughout the coding of the message, it is a static
model and the system is a non-adaptive data compression system. In an adaptive data
compression system^ the model is updated by the incoming data to reflect the local
statistics of data.
In adaptive statistical compression algorithms such as adaptive Huffman or adaptive

2.3. Security

10

Encoder

Decoder

Figure 2.3: Data compression model
arithmetic coding, the probabilities of source symbols and the codewords assigned to the
source symbols are dynamically updated according to the incoming source messages.
The encoder can update the distribution of symbols by observing input symbols and
the decoder can follow the change of the encoder by observing the decoded symbols.

2.2.5

P P M models

PPM stands for Prediction by Partial Matching. PPM takes the context into account.
The probabilities of symbols are given as the conditional probabilities. That is, when a
symbol Xi is seen in a source after a sequence
oi Xi following the context

•••j^i-i, then the probability

- - . ^ i - i is given by

..., x^.o+i, iCi-o)-

The number of symbols in the context, O, is the order of the model. When the symbol
with the 0 — 1 preceding symbols is not found in the model, the order is reduced and
the shorter string in the model, ie. x^-o+i,

is looked up. When the order

drops, a special escape symbol is encoded so that the decoder notices the change of the
order. When there is no match in the model, equally distributed symbol probabilities
are used. The model keeps the frequencies of symbols in a tree structure (generally
called trie). Generally P P M models achieve good compression ratio. The disadvantage
is that as the order of the model grows, the number of the nodes may increase by the
exponent of the number of symbols.

2.3
2.3.1

Security
Symmetric encryption system

A symmetric key cryptosystem allows secure communication over an insecure channel
between two parties who share a key. A symmetric encryption algorithm is a collection
e = {Ejc : K = 1,2 ' • • N} oi invertible transformations indexed by a piece of information called key. To encrypt a plaintext message X , the transmitter who shares a key k

2.3.
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Security

with the receiver, finds the ciphertext Y = Ek{X) and sends it to the receiver who can
use the inverse transformation to recover X. The attacker does not know the key. An
attacker can always use an exhaustive key search strategy to determine the key and so
the number of keys gives an upper bound on the security of the system.
Plain Text

Cipher Text
Encryption

T

Plain Text

; Insecure Channel

1

Secure Channel

Decryption

>

i

Key

Figure 2.4: Model of symmetric encryption system

2.3.2

Attacks

An enemy attempts to find the key, or the plaintext of a ciphertext. An encryption
system can be attacked by an enemy. There are several attack models as shown below.
Ciphertext-only attack An attacker knows only the ciphertext. That is, he/she has
access to Ek{X). This is possible if he/she can eavesdrop the channel.
K n o w n plaintext attack An attacker knows a set of pairs of plaintexts and their
corresponding ciphertexts and tries to discover a key or a plaintext which is not
in the known set. This is possible if he/she can eavesdrop the channel and has
partial access to the plaintexts.
Chosen plaintext attack An attacker can choose a plaintext and obtain the corresponding ciphertext. This is possible if he/she has access to the encryption
system and can conduct some experiments.
Chosen ciphertext attack An attacker can choose a ciphertext and observe the corresponding plaintext. This is possible if he/she has access to the decryption
system and can conduct some experiments.

2.3.3

R e d u n d a n c y of a l a n g u a g e

A natural language can be seen as a message source and so can be analyzed using
information theory [BP82]. Let S be the alphabet of a language with M symbols, and

3 0009 0 3 2 5 4 6 6 8 6
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S^ denote a string of k characters. Then the rate of language r^ for messages of length
k is the average amount of information in each character of messages of length k and
is given by
Tk - — ^ — .

(2.8)

The absolute rate of a language is the maximum amount of information that could
be encoded in each character using the alphabet S assuming that all combinations of
symbols are equally likely. It is given by
R = \og^M.

(2.9)

The redundancy of a language D with rate r is given by
(2.10)

D = R-r.

For English, r^ has been estimated as 1.0 to 1.5 bits/letter and R is 4.7 bits/letter.
High value of R means that English language is highly redundant

For a language,

less redundancy means more statistical independence of the successive characters in a
message.

2.3.4

Unicity distance

When a language is redundant, the knowledge of statistical properties of the language
can be used to attack an encryption system [BP82]. The unicity distance UA is the
amount of ciphertext required by the attacker to uniquely identify the plaintext, and
is given by
= m

.

(2.11)

When the unicity distance is small, the short ciphertext gives enough information to
uniquely identify the key K and hence the security is weak. By lowering R, that is
compressing the source and reducing redundancy, unicity distance is increased and a
more secure system is obtained. Unicity distance is only related to a particular type of
attack and so large unicity distance does not necessarily mean strong security against
all attacks.

2.3.5

Data compression and security

Compressing a message source before encryption increases the security by removing the
redundancy from the source messages and increasing the unicity distance. An encryption algorithm produces ciphertexts that look like random sequence and so have less

2.4. Arithmetic coding
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redundancy. This means that ciphertexts cannot be much compressed. As encryptions
are now widely in use on many computer systems, compression before encryption is
an important strategy for efficient use of resources. Combining compression and encryption algorithm has the advantage of added efficiency and automatic compression
before encryption.

2.4

Arithmetic coding

Arithmetic coding is an optimal data compression algorithm. It was discovered independently by Pasco and Rissanen [BWC90 .
Arithmetic coding encodes a message into a bit string which represents a real number interval within the interval [0,1). It starts with an initial interval, usually [0,1),
and then narrows it down as new symbols arrive such that the amount of narrowing is
determined by the probability of the incoming symbol.

2.4.1

Encoding

The encoder narrows the interval, [/, h), down based on a pair of cumulative frequencies
given by a received symbol. Then it outputs the value that represents the interval as
a sequence of bits.
Assume that there are Naymboi symbols and a symbol il^li] is given a probability
I <i<

Nsy^boh and T.^JT'"'pWj])

= 1- The probability of i;\i] is defined as

p{ip[0]) = 0 and p{ip[i]) ^ 0 ior 1 < i < N. Then the pair of cumulative probabilities,
Ch{ip[i]) and ci{ip[i]), for tpli] is given by

cim)

=

(2.12)
(2.13)

When a symbol ip[i] arrives, the lower bound of the interval I is raised and the upper
bound h is lowered. That is.
(2.14)

knew =

I + {h - l)Ch{lp\i])

(2.15)

where Ci{ip[i]) and Ch{ip[i]) are given by (2.13) and (2.13).
The example Fig.2.5 shows how the interval is narrowed down. Assume that there
are 10 symbols, that is, Naymboi = 10. Fori < z < N,ymboileti;\i] G {A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H, I, J},
and the initial interval is [0,1). Then a message ABC is encoded as follows.

2A.

Arithmetic

coding
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^0.05 0.0450.04 0.0350.03 0.0250.02 0.0150.01 0.005---

1.0-

0.90.8-

0.70.6-

0.50.40.30.2-

0.1-

0.00

0.0-

^ 0.0050 —
0.00475-0.0045 - 0.00425-0.0040 - 0.00375-0.0035 - 0.00325-0.0030 - 0.00275- 0.0025 —

—

1.0

0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6

0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1

--

0.0

B

A B C D E F G H

I J

Figure 2.5: Example of encoding a message "ABC"
1. The encoder encodes A. The pair of cumulative probabilities are C/,(A) = 0.05
and c/(A) = 0.0. The interval [0,1) is narrowed down and the new interval is
hnew = 0.0 -f (1.0 - 0.0) • 0.05 = 0.05 and

= 0.0 -f (1.0 - 0.0) • 0.0 = 0.0.

2. The encoder encodes B. The pair of cumulative probabilities are C/i(B)

0.1 and

q(B) = 0.05. The interval [0,0.05) is narrowed down and the new interval is
hnew = 0.0 -h (0.05 - 0.0) • 0.1 = 0.005 and Lew = 0.0 + (0.05 - 0.0) • 0.05 = 0.0025.
3. The encoder encodes C. The pair of cumulative probabilities are Ck{C) = 0.175
and c/(C) = 0.1. The interval [0.0025,0.005) is narrowed down and the new
interval is h^^ew = 0.0025 -h (0.005 - 0.0025) • 0.175 = 0.0029375 and

=

0.0025 -f (0.005 - 0.0025) • 0.1 = 0.00275.
Step
1
2
3

A
B
C

ChW
0.05
0.1
0.175

ciW
0.0
0.05
0.1

h
1.0
0.05
0.005

I
0.0
0.0
0.0025

hnew
0.05
0.005
0.0029375

^new
0.0
0.0025
0.00275

Table 2.1: Example calculation of the interval for a message ABC

2.4.2

Decoding

The decoder transforms encoder's output back into the original symbols. The encoded
interval is compared with the cumulative probabilities of symbols and the symbol that
includes the interval is chosen.
In the example Fig.2.5, the encoded interval is [0.00275,0.0029375).

Then the

cumulative probabilities of each symbol is compared with the interval. The symbol A
includes the interval so the decoder decodes it. The decoder will choose B as the second
symbol after seeing A and so on.

2.4.
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coding

Notice that the output of the encoder is not a unique interval but any value in the
interval is sufficient to correctly decode a message.

2.4.3

Advantage of arithmetic coding

When a message consists of a sequence of m symbols, V'l? V'2) •••V'mj then the required
length to encode the message is shown as
(2.16)

where p[ipi) is the probability of a symbol ipi.
The compressed data consists of an integral number of bits. In arithmetic coding, a
whole message must consist of integral number of bits but each symbol does not have
such restriction. If the result of encoding a symbol includes a fraction of a bit, it is
passed to the next symbol. This is the advantage of arithmetic coding over Huffman
coding. In case of Huffman coding, each symbol should be translated into an integral
number of bits and so the fraction of a bit is rounded up to a bit if there is any. The
extra fraction for each output symbol cumulates as encoding proceeds and hence adds
to the length of the encoded message.

2.4.4

Models in arithmetic coding

A model in arithmetic coding is to provide statistics of symbols for the coder. A model
has great significance in the compression system and largely affects the compression
ratio. It is obvious from (2.16) that the higher is the probability of an incoming symbol,
the less is the output length. An arithmetic coding with a model that produces accurate
prediction can achieve a good compression.
There are two types of models. A non-adaptive model provides fixed statistics for
symbols throughout a whole message. An adaptive model provides symbol statistics
that dynamically change as the frequencies of symbols in a message change.

The

implementation of non-adaptive models will be easier than adaptive ones. However,
for a message in which the probability distribution of symbols changes, adaptive models
can achieve better compression.
There are various approaches to implement a model. The most common approach
is to use Markov modeling. One of the well known algorithms is Prediction
Matching

by Partial

(PPM) [CW84]. The model predicts the next symbol based on O last seen

symbols. The model is often called order-0

model, based on the number of symbols O

2.5. Implementation
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of arithmetic coding

used for the prediction. There are some variations such as PPMA and PPMB [Irv95^.
The model is implemented as a trie which has a tree structure.
The system can achieve a reasonably good compression with order-3 or order-4 on
English text. However, according to the data shown in [CW84], the memory requirement is large. In the worst case the number of nodes in the tree can grow exponentially. If the order is lower, compression programs such as gzip [Gai93] (which uses
Ziv-Lempel scheme) or more recently bzip2 [Sew98] (which uses block-sorting scheme
BW94]) can achieve better compression on text and non-text sources [FB98

2.5

Implementation of arithmetic coding

A software implementation of arithmetic coding was developed by Witten/Neal/Cleary
WNC87] (WNC implementation ). The implementation is order-0 adaptive arithmetic
encoder/decoder, which means the model consists of the frequencies of symbols.

2.5.1

The model

The adaptive model is implemented as an ordered frequency table, where the symbol
with the highest frequency appears at the top and other symbols are listed in decreasing
order. Each symbol has a frequency and a cumulative frequency, which is the sum of
the frequencies of all the symbols below it. The adaptiveness is achieved by updating
the frequency of a symbol when it is seen in the message sequence. In this case, its
frequency together with the cumulative frequencies of that symbol and all the symbols
above it are similarly incremented by 1. If the increment results in the violation of the
frequency order, the symbol is moved up in the table so that the frequency order is
maintained.
Symbol

Freq.

Cum Freq.

0

257

0x00

1

256

0x01

1

255

0x02

1

254

OxFE

1

2

OxFF

1

1

EOF

1

0

Figure 2.6: Implementation of the frequency table
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2.5.2

The coder

The coding procedure is realized using finite precision integer arithmetic. The interval
is represented by two 16 bit numbers representing high and low values. The values
are updated based on model probabilities and consist of the matched part of the high
and low values. With the incoming symbol, the new high and low values are
calculated as
K

{hi

=

h+ [

=

h+ [

-

Chi'tpmax)

-

1

(2.17)

Chii^max)

where ip' is the next symbol below ip in the table and hence Ci{ip) = Chii^') and
Ch{ipmax) is the sum of all frequencies.
If h'- and I'- have u common most significant bits, the following step will be executed
u times : the most significant bit of h'- and I'- that are the same, is sent to the output
and h'- and I'- are left-shifted.
Define two functions So{x,u) which left-shifts x by u bits and fills the least significant u bits by 0 and Si{x,u) which left-shifts x by u bits and fills the least significant
u bits by 1. Assuming that h'- and I'- produce output Oi and the size of Oj is u bits, the
resulting high and low values are as follows
h'l =
I"

High value
Low value

Si(h'„u)
(2.18)

=

Before encoding

After encoding

After output

1011001101101100

0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 11

11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0000111011101011

0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 01

01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Figure 2.7: Output the range
However, there is a special case. If the interval satisfies 0x4000 < interval <
OxCOOO, mid-range buffering is used. In this case, 0x4000 is subtracted from both values, they are left-shifted, and one bit, which is not yet fixed, is stored in bits_to jf ollow,
which is a mid-range buffer. This bit is determined when the next output bit is determined. The detail is described in the following section.
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The output is produced by repeating the procedure above. The algorithm that we
describe is based on WNC implementation assuming that the size of the high and low
values is 16 bits.
How to output bits
A new range from the old high and low values and the cumulative frequencies of a
symbol, are calculated by using the following states.
1. State 1
The MSB of the high and low values are the same ( ® in Figure 2.8). In this
case, the MSB is output and the high and low values are left-shifted by 1 bit and
• 0 is set to the LSB of the low value.
• 1 to the LSB of the high value.
2. State 2
The MSB of the high and low values are different and the low value starts with
the bit pattern 01 and the high value starts with the bit pattern 10 ( (2) in Figure
2.8). The following section describes the detail of the procedure in this case.
3. State 3
The MSB of the high and low values are different and the bit patterns of the high
and low values are not in State 2 ( (3) in Figure 2.8). In this case, encoding of
the symbol finishes.
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11
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Figure 2.8: Possible states of a range
The procedure of outputting bits proceeds as follows.
• If the range is either in State 1 or 2, execute the appropriate procedure for the
state, output bit sequence and update the high and low values. Then, analyze
the new high and low values according to the states again.
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If the range is in State 3, finish encoding.

vj V vj

®
Figure 2.9: State transition of the procedures for State 1, 2 and 3

Special case of the range
If the high value starts with the bit pattern 10 and the low value starts with the bit
pattern 01, then 01000000 00000000 is subtracted from both the high and low values
( Transition from ® to (2) in Figure 2.10 and Figure 2.11 ).
Then the two values are left-shifted by 1 bit that is equivalent to multiplying the
values by two, and
• the LSB of the low value is set to 0.
• the LSB of the high value is set to 1.
( from (D to (3) in Figure 2.10 and Figure 2.11 ).
Notice that the MSB of the resulting high value is 1 and that of the low value is 0.
Originally high value starts with 10 and the low value starts with 01.
When 01000000 00000000 is subtracted from both values the result is that the
high value starts with 01 and the low value starts with 00. After the left-shift, the
high value is 1 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 1 and the low value is 0 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 0 . Hence, the
result is either in State 2 or 3.
Then, a unknown hit ( still unknown if it is 0 or 1 ) is put into a special buffer and
the state of the high and low values is analyzed in the same way again. The unknown
bits should be fixed when an output bit is produced by the pattern 1.
If the bit produced is 1, the first output is 1 and the rest of the bits are 0. If the
bit is 0, the first bit is 0 and following bits are 1.

2.6. Conclusion
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Figure 2.10: Special case of the range : Example 1
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Figure 2.11: Special case of the range : Example 2
For example, if encoding a symbol results in an unknown bit ( (2) in Figure 2.12 )
and the first bit of encoding of the next symbol is 0 ( (4) in Figure 2.12 ), the output
will be 01 ( ® in Figure 2.12 ).
This can be verified by mapping the range of the next symbol to the range of the
previous symbol.
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Figure 2.12: Example of how to fix the unknown bit (1)
Similarly, if encoding a symbol results in an unknown bit ( @ in Figure 2.13 ) and
the first bit of encoding the next symbol is 1 ( 0

in Figure 2.13 ), the output will be

10 ( ® in Figure 2.13 ).

2.6

Conclusion

Arithmetic coding is an optimal compression scheme. The performance is largely determined by the model. The model is generally based on Markov modeling. P P M models
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Unknown bits with a known bit at the end
777 . . . 7
777 . . . 70

Output
100...00
O i l . . .11

Table 2.2: Example of output of unknown bits
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Figure 2.13: Example of how to fix the unknown bit (2)
can achieve a reasonably good performance but such models with higher order require
larger amount of memory compared with other algorithms such as Ziv-Lempel. The
performance of the lower order models is not as good as algorithms such as Ziv-Lempel
and block-sorting.

Chapter 3
Arithmetic coding encryption schemes
Arithmetic coding is an optimal compression algorithm. Compression provides efficient
use of channel by reducing the redundancy of data. Compressing data before applying
encryption improves security (Section 2.3). If arithmetic coding can be also made to
provide security, less overall processing overhead can be expected. Arithmetic coding
encryption schemes were proposed by Witten/Cleary [WC88]. Later several attacks on
the proposed schemes were published. In this chapter, we describe arithmetic coding
encryption schemes, briefly look at the effect of added security on the compression
performance and give an assessment of security of the resulting systems. In Section 3.2
and 3.3 we review three known attacks on model-based schemes. The first attack is
against non-adaptive models and the other two are against adaptive systems. Section
3.4 shows an attack on a coder-based scheme which uses binary alphabet and Section
3.5 summarizes attacks and the problems of the schemes.

3.1

Arithmetic coding encryption schemes

Adaptive arithmetic coding encryption schemes were motivated by the following observations [WC88 .
1. Models for data compression are often very large and may act as an enormous
key.
2. If an adaptive model is used, the key depends on the entire transmitted text and
finding the key would require tracking the changes to the model by decoding the
entire transmission since initialization.
3. It is very difficult to regain synchronization
decompression are different.

if the models for compression

and
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The proposed arithmetic coding encryption schemes are symmetric encryption algorithms. Depending on which part of the arithmetic encoder/decoder contributes to
the key, the schemes are divided into two categories, that is, model-based schemes and
coder-based schemes.

Also there is a scheme which combines the two. We describe

these schemes in the following sections.

3.1.1

Model-based schemes

In Witten et aVs proposal, the model is used as the encryption key: that is the details
of the model are only known to the transmitter and the receiver. These schemes are
called model-based.

Model-based scheme 1
The secret key of the scheme is the initial model.
In the scheme, the initial model is transmitted through a secure channel and is
shared by the transmitter and the receiver. The other parameters such as the initial
range of the coder is public. The information about the type of the model, such as
P P M and the order of the model, are public. The secret is the parameters such as the
initial frequencies of symbols and the order of symbols in the frequency table. Witten
and Cleary suggested an array of single-character frequencies in the range of 1-10.

Model-based scheme 2
The secret key of the scheme is an initial string.
The initial model and range are public and the key is a secret string, shared by
the transmitter and receiver, that is input to the system before the actual message is
started. The initial string is sent through a secure channel proceeding the transmission
of a message. The key string modifies the models and the ranges in both the encoder
and the decoder to one which is unknown to the attacker.

3.1.2

Coder-based schemes

An alternative approach proposed by Irvine, Cleary and Rinsma-Melchert is coder-based
scheme [ICRM95;.
The secret key of the scheme is a bit string which is used to narrow the range.
Based on the key bit sequence, either the high value h is decreased or the low value
I is increased by the amount {h — l)£ where e: is a public parameter and 0 < e < 1.
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The known parameter e can be a part of the key but it must be carefully chosen
not to affect the compression performance. A variation of this scheme, proposed in
LFB981, is described in detail in the next section.

3.1.3

A combined scheme

Liu/Farrell/Boyd proposed a system that combines the model-based and the coderbased schemes [LFB98]. The secret key of the scheme consists of the following.
1. The initial model.
2. The initial range in the coder. The range should be larger than ^^ ^ ^^.
3. A 16 bit substitution that is used to substitute the first 16 bits of encoder's
output.
4. Two sets of shrinking factors (£ho,£io) s-^d (chijSiJ, each consisting of an upper
and a lower shrinking factor. This is used to narrow the range after encoding of
a symbol. The shrinking factors £hj and

should satisfy £ho ^ £hi and ei^ ^

and 0.9000 < Sh^ < 0.9999 and 0.0000 < £i. < 0.0999 where j G {0,1}.
5. A 128 bit random sequence to control the two sets of shrinking factors. This is
cyclically used.

Model
Symbol •

Coder

Freq table

••I rangri'
ct

b

£ hO £ h 1
£10 £ii
116-bit mask"] •

Figure 3.1: LFB scheme
The procedure to encode a symbol is as follows.
S t e p 1 Encoding a symbol according to (2.17).
S t e p 2 Output a bit sequence. The high and low values are modified as shown in
Fig.2.7.
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Step 3 Shrink the range.
For a set of shrinking factors (eho,£io) and {sh^^eij, the new hi^i and

are

calculated as follows.

h^i

=

+

(3.1)

j e { 0 , 1 } , and is chosen according to the 128 bit random sequence.
Range

( hi , li )

Procedure

Q e ^

Encode

(hi',li' )
ES^

Output

(hi",li")
^ ^

{hul ,lui )
Shrink

f ^ ^ Q

Interval of
message

Figure 3.2: Procedure of LFB scheme
Liu/Farrell/Boyd claimed that the scheme is resistant against Bergen/Hogan attack
(3.3.1) and estimated the cost of attacking the system to be 2^^ x 2^° x 2^® x 2^® = 2^^

3.1.4

Initialization and reset of the encoder

In all schemes, initialization of a system includes loading of the key and initialization
of other parameters. In some cases, a system may need to be reset to provide better
security.
Initialization and reset should be clearly differentiated. An arithmetic coder encryption scheme has two kinds of parameters which must be set before start of a message.
These are i) secret key parameters, for example model in a model-based scheme, and
a ) non-key public parameters such as coder range in model-based schemes. During
initialization both groups of parameters are set to chosen values which form default
values of the system. In system reset key parameters are always set back to default
values; non-key ones may take their default values or have new values (publicly known).
Reset may be automatically invoked by the encoder/decoder. The trigger may be an
end of the message symbol/signal, ie. EOF, or may be when a message size reaches a
certain size.

3.1.5

Effect on data compression performance

One of the important criteria for the performance of an arithmetic encoding encryption
schemes is the effect of the added encryption on the data compression performance.
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ie. the compression ratio which is the average number of bits per input symbol, and
the speed which is the average time to process an input symbol.

In either of the

model-based schemes, the initial model or the initial string will be randomly chosen.
Hence the given model for a message does not necessarily represent the statistics of
symbols in the message. If an adaptive model is used, as data compression proceeds
the initial model is overwritten by the statistics of the incoming message. Witten et
al estimated that 1,000 symbols are enough for order-0 adaptive models to adjust the
model to the input message. So if the length of a message is considerably longer than
1,000, the impact of randomly chosen model or initial string on the data compression
performance will be small.
In the case of the coder-based schemes, the added encryption algorithm has continuous influence on the data compression. The drop of the compression ratio may be
minimized by appropriate choice of e. However, the scheme will have reduced compression speed because the extra-narrowing is equivalent to encoding a second symbol.
For example, the combined scheme by Liu et al [LFB98] results in approximately 2%
drop in the compression rate and almost doubles the processing time.
Encryption schemes should be carefully designed so that the drop in the compression
ratio and speed is minimized. Otherwise, arithmetic coding encryption schemes can be
beaten by a conventional method of using compression and encryption as two separate
subsystems, and there is no benefit in using arithmetic coding encryption schemes.

3.1.6

Security of the schemes

One simple method of evaluating security is the size of the key space. In model-based
schemes, the key is the model and hence the size of the key space is the number of all
possible states of the model. As an example, in case of model-based schemes with the
order-0 model, assume that the number of symbols is N.ymboi and the initial frequency
F{ip) for a symbol ip can be any number between 1 and F^ax ; that is 1 < F{ip) < F^axThen the number of possible combinations is F^ax^'""'"''then there are

If symbols are ordered,

N.ymboi = ^symboi^- possible orders of symbols. So the number

of possible initial models (keys) is Fmax^'y^'"' • N,ymboi\- In the case of coder-based
schemes, assuming that the size of the key sequence is 5, there are

possible key

values. If the exhaustive key search is used to attack a system, the figures given above
show at most how many attempts are required.
However, the numbers only give an upper bound as the security.

If a different

attack method is used, the difficulty of breaking a system will change. The security

3.2. Attack on non-adaptive arithmetic coding encryption scheme
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strength is largely determined by the attack method used. Hence it is not an easy task
to evaluate the security without investigating every possible attack method.

3.2

Attack on non-adaptive arithmetic coding encryption scheme

BH [BH92] demonstrated an attack on non-adaptive model-based arithmetic coding encryption scheme. They showed that each symbol corresponds to a fixed output pattern
and so non-adaptive system is not suitable for encryption.

Cleary/Irvine/Rinsma-

Melchert demonstrated a chosen plaintext attack on non-adaptive model-based encryption using binary alphabet (input) to obtain the model. They showed that u + 2
characters are sufficient to uniquely determine a u bit probability [CIRM95]. This
target system is much simpler than 8-bit alphabet system.

3.3

Attacks on adaptive schemes

3.3.1

Bergen/Hogan attack

BH attack on adaptive schemes is a chosen plaintext attack where the attacker can
feed plaintexts of her/his choice to the encoder. The attack does not discover the key
(initial model) but succeeds to modify the model into a form which is known to the
attacker, hence allowing the attacker to decrypt the communication afterwards.
For the attack to work, the following assumptions are used :
• The system is a model-based scheme of first or second type. That is, the key is
either initial model or the initial string. The initial state of the encoder does not
affect the attack.
• The system uses order-0 adaptive arithmetic coding. The attack is based on
WNC implementation .
• The attacker is able to send symbols to the encoder and obtain the output.
• The attacker has a decoder.
This attack uses two properties of the WNC implementation : halving of symbols'
frequencies when the F(V'max) = i^max, and imposed ordering on the frequency table.
The attack consists of two steps.

3.3. Attacks on adaptive schemes
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Step 1 The attacker sends a long enough string of a single symbol,

to cause halving.

If the string is chosen long enough, with enough number of halvings occurring,
ip eventually moves to the top of the table and frequencies of all other symbols
become 1. If more V' are sent so that another halving occurs, the frequency of
V'max will become a constant, given by
= L

-^max

^symbols 1

(3.2)

where N^y^^oU is the number of symbols. We refer to this state of the model as
synchronized state. We note that once the model is synchronized the number of
ip required to produce another halving, denoted by n, becomes a constant

^ — -^max

{^symbola l)

^max. {^aymbola l)

(3.3)

At this stage the attacker does not know the order of symbols.
Step 2 He/She sends other symbols one by one, each time moving the sent symbol
above other symbols, the frequencies of which are 1, and hence effectively reordering symbols in the frequency table.
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Figure 3.3: Example of BH attack
However the re-ordering will fail if halving occurs during this step. To guarantee
the successful re-ordering, it is necessary for already re-ordered symbols not to move.
This condition is satisfied when the frequencies of already re-ordered symbols are 2.
After the synchronization of the model (Step 1), the frequency of each symbol except
the one at the top of the table becomes 1. By sending symbols to re-order (Step 2),
their frequencies become 2. If halving occurs, all those frequencies will become 1 and
hence those symbols in the table may move when a symbol is sent.
Now the model can be verified by decoding a message. We note that for correct
decoding the attacker must know the range of the coder at this stage.
assumed knowledge in BH attack.

This is an

29

3.3. Attacks on adaptive schemes

To protect against this attack, BH proposed regular changing of Fmax- Transmitter
and receiver use a shared pseudo random sequence to generate consecutive values of
-^max- Since halving occurs when the F(V'max) = •f'max the halving points become
unpredictable. This randomization in general reduces the compression rate (although
in special cases compression rate might be improved).

Lim/Boyd/Dawson suggest

regular resetting of the model during encoding a message [LBD97] which effectively
discards a model modified by an attacker. However, as shown by their experiment,
more frequent reset results in reduced compression rate and this reduction is higher for
higher order models.
The attack uses the properties of the adaptive model. Hence any adaptive model
has a possibility of the attack although how easy to control the model by a message
sent will vary with the type of the model. A model of quick adaptation to an input
message can also be quick to be taken control. Obviously the adaptation speed affects
the compression so the protection against the attack by slowing down the adaptation
will also drop the compression. As can be seen from the attack, an order-0 model can
be easily controlled by the attack. However a model of the higher order such as PPM
can be attacked by the method but whether or not it is practical in terms of the cost
of the attack is unknown.

3.3.2

Lim/Boyd/Dawson attack

As noted earlier, BH attack does not find the key. Lim et al showed a chosen plaintext
attack that discovers the key. For the attack to work, the following assumptions are
used.
• The system is a model-based scheme of type 1. The initial frequencies of symbols
are unknown. The order of symbols in the symbol table and the initial range are
known.
• The system can be an adaptive arithmetic coding of any order.
• The attacker can send symbols to the encoder and obtain the output.
• The attacker can reset the system, that is, after sending a string through the
coder, it can return to the starting state.
The attacker first tries to find out the frequency of the symbol at the bottom of the
table, F(V'min)j a-nd the total cumulative frequency C/i(V'max)- For this purpose, s/he
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sends Vmin to the encoder and then terminates the message to obtain the output. Using
exhaustive search, possible combinations of F(ifi^n) and C/,(V'max) which produce the
same output are obtained. The rest of the symbols are attacked in a similar way. As
the attack proceeds, the number of possibilities for a symbol frequency, assuming all
the previous frequencies and ChO^m^) are known, reduces and so although exhaustive
search is used, it is more efficient than the naive exhaustive search.
To protect against the attack, Lim et al proposed regular reset with different nonkey default values, or full initialization each time.

These are the same protection

measures used against BH attack.

3.4

Attack on coder-based scheme

Irvine, Cleary and Rinsma-Melchert [ICRM95] described an attack on the coder-based
scheme. The analysis is based on a static arithmetic coding using an alphabet of size
two. An encoding result can be represented by a polynomial in symbol probability
of symbols, a constant e and the key bits, which are the unknown. It is showed that
the security can be reduced to a subset sum problem. Irvine et al concluded that the
security must come from the model rather than the arithmetic coder.

3.5

Conclusion

Arithmetic coding encryption schemes are to provide security using arithmetic data
compression systems by hiding the internal information required to decompress encoder's output. If this can be achieved without adding costly algorithms, better efficiency is expected. The information, which is kept secret, ie. the key of the encryption
system, can be the parameters in the model or the coder. The schemes are categorized
into model-based, coder-based and their combined schemes. In model-based schemes,
the drop in compression performance can be minimized using the advantage of adaptive
models. Coder-based schemes have the disadvantage of drop in the processing speed.
In both cases the security of the system cannot be simply evaluated based on the size
of the key space.
There are several attacks which use different properties of arithmetic coding. BH
attack on adaptive system uses the adaptive property of the model. The attack by Lim
et al uses the public knowledge about the model. It is known that the frequency of a
symbol takes a value within a certain range and how it is updated. In the attack on
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coder-based schemes, encoder's output is used to solve a polynomial and determines
the key bits.
In the following chapter, we demonstrate new attacks on the schemes.

Chapter 4
New Attacks
Previously known attacks showed that the properties of arithmetic coding can be exploited to break the system. In this chapter we demonstrate new attacks on arithmetic
coding encryption schemes and show various new ways of exploiting these properties
for attacking the system.
In Section 4.1, new attacks which strengthen the BH attack on the model-based
schemes are described. There are two weak points in the BH attack : i) if halving
occurs during the re-ordering procedure, re-ordering fails and ii) the BH attack can
not find the coder's secrets, ie. the high and low values. In Section 4.1 we show how
to detect halving and then describe the methods of finding the high and low values.
In Section 4.2 we demonstrate an attack against the combined-scheme which is an
extended BH attack.

Finally we summarize the attacks and the properties used in

them.

4.1

Strengthening BH attack

The major weakness of the BH attack is the re-ordering procedure and that after overflooding, the model is only roughly known and it is necessary to verify the state of the
model by decoding the output of the encoder. To correctly decode encoder's output, it
is necessary to know the order of symbols in the frequency table and the high and low
values in the coder. If halving of frequencies occurs during the re-ordering procedure,
re-ordering fails and it must be performed again. If the attacker can determine the halving point, then this problem can be avoided by doing re-ordering right after the halving.
Since the halving period is approximately 8000 symbols and re-ordering requires only
255 symbols, re-ordering right after halving guarantees successful re-ordering. After
the successful re-ordering, there are several methods either to investigate the high and
low values from encoder's output, or to force the high and low values to take certain
values.

4 . 1 .
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In the following, we show two methods of finding halving points by observing encoder's output. Then we demonstrate several attacks on the system that allow the
range of the coder to be estimated.

4.1.1

Detection of the halving point

The first method, which can detect the exact halving point, uses repeated experiments
on the output and hence is more expensive.

It can be avoided by initializing the

system before each message. The second one, uses the size of output per symbol to find
-P'(V'max), resulting in the number of possible values to be reduced from
because after synchronization of the model,
and hence, there are 8320

to 2®. This is

satisfies 8064 <

< 16383

2^^ possible values for F(V'niax)- BH attack blindly tries to

decode using all possible values one at a time. Using our proposed attack the number
of possible values can be reduced to 2®.
The relationship between halvings and the size of the encoder's output
The length of the encoder's output will give some information about halvings. Let
a symbol ip be sent to synchronize the model.

Prom (2.17), let i, given by i

^^ denote the frequency
chronization of the model, and

=

right after a halving after the syn-

given by /^^x =

- N.ymboi - t, denote the

frequency F(V'max) just before a halving. Notice that because

J = i, /^ax is

equal to either i or i — 1. This means that every other symbol has a frequency of 1.
Now assume we keep sending the symbol ip.

In this case F(i/'niax) will consecutively

take the values from t to /max and the probability of

will consecutively take the

values
¿4-2

t
t -f N a y m b o l

— 1 ' i -f N s y m b o l

— 1 +

1 ' i +

Naymbol

t
"

1 +

2 '

^t +

4- /max

Nsymbol

"

1 +

/max

. This can be written as

t +

^ s y m b o l

-

1 +

i

where 0 < i < /max- Just before halving, i = /max- When halving occurs at this stage
the probability changes from P f ^ , ^ =
change in the size of the output is
change with different values of

t

when

to Po(^) = ¡iTfl^^pr- The
to log2Po{ip). The graph 4.1 shows the

N^ymboi

= 256.

As the graph shows, a halving almost doubles the output rate (bits/symbol) regardless of the value of t. The change will result in a noticeable change in the encoder
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Figure 4.1: Change in the output size for Nsymbol ==256
output in terms of values and size. We give two methods of using this information to
obtain a good estimate of the halving point.
(1) Using repeated experiments on the output
The change can be observed as the change in the narrowing down of the interval.
Between two halving points, the change in the probability of the symbol that is used
to over-flood the model, compared to the change caused by the halving, is relatively
small. The probability is directly reflected in how much the interval is narrowed down.
Hence by observing the change in the rate of the narrowing of the interval, it is possible
to detect the halving point.
Assume that the model is synchronized and t is as defined in the previous section.
Let Ij and hj denote the low value and high values, respectively, and Vj denote the
range given by Vj = hj - and the probability of symbol i/^max is Fj(V^max)- After
the synchronization, when the symbol V'max is encoded, h'- = Ij +
=
hj and hence the high value does not change and takes the value OxFFFF. At the
point right before halving, j = /^ax - 1 and the probability of ip is
(V'max) =
i+iVjy^fcoi —H-/max —1 '

In the following, we calculate the low value and the range just before the halving
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point
int, after the halving point and then at two more consecutive points. Then we look
at the behavior of ^^^

j e { 1 , 2 , 3 } , and show how to have a good estimate for the

Iviner Doint.
halving
point.
Just before the halving point, we have
1
J ,
^symbol ^
¿1 z= Iq ^Q
t H" ^symbol
1 + /max
n

=

A/i

=

~ ^
=:ro
i + ^symbol - 1 + /max

h^-h=ho-lo-ro

tUll^
t + A^aymfcoi " 1 + /max

li-lo
^

^symbol 1

(4.2)

i + ^symbol - 1 + /max
Similarly,

t -r
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Ah

=

symbol — ^
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i + ^symbol " 1
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2t

t + /max
t + N.ymbol - 1

i -h

(4.6)

- 1

The last approximation step is true because /^ax is equal to, or very close to t.
Similarly, from (4.3) and (4.4), and from (4.4) and (4.5), the ratio of A k and A/3
IS

A/

_

ri7
^^ {t + N,ymb0l-l){t

i^sym(,ol-l)t
+
N,ymb0l-l+l)

r,

AI2

t + Nsymbcl

t

AU

^*ymboi-l
-1 + 1

(t + Nsymbol

(4.7)

- 1)

N,ymbol-l
t + l

.

t + Symbol - 1 + 2

t

(4.8)

(i + N.ymbol - 1)

Approximation steps are true because t is large.
Comparing (4.6) with (4.7) and (4.8), we note that the ratio is almost doubled
right after the halving point and stayed nearly constant afterwards, (compare (4.7)
with (4.8)). This difference can be used to detect the halving point.
The outline of the attack is as follows:
Step 1 Send a long enough sequence of a single character, ip^ to synchronize the model.
Finish encoding and obtain encoder's output, Oj where j = 1. Increment j .
Step 2 Repeat the following step at most /max times.
Send a message 1 character longer than the previous one, using ip.
ing and obtain encoder's output, Oj.

Finish encod-

Calculate A o j = Oj — O j _ i . Increment i.

Observe the sequence Oj. Between two halving points, A o j gradually decreases
but it is doubled just after the halving point.
An example for step 2 calculations, that is A o j = Oj —

-

0110100 . . .
0110100 . . .
0000000 . . .

11011010100
11001101000
00001101100

is as follows.

{oj)
(oj_i)
{Aoj)

Change in Aoi at the halving point could be as recorded in Table 4.1.
This method relies on accurate output values and so it is necessary to finish encoding
for each sequence of symbols. Although this method enables accurate detection of the
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5128
5048
4972
9624
9328
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Halving point

Table 4.1: Example of Aoj values
halving point, it is expensive and can be easily avoided by using different non-key
values or initializing the system for each message.
(2) Non-repeated analysis of the output
Since there is a noticeable change in the probability before and after a halving, it is
possible to detect the halving point by observing how many bits are produced when a
symbol is encoded. The advantage of this method is that it does not require repeated
experiments. In the implementation that are considered, t = 8064, N^y^boi = 256
and /max = 8063, and so the number of required bits for a symbol changes from
= -log,0.9692 = 0.045 to - W 2 ^o^+tteTsoss = -^"520.9844 = 0.023.
In practice, the number of bits per symbol will not precisely follow these exact
values. The reasons for this are ij mid-range buffering ii) the output is always an
integral number of bits while a symbol might need a fractional number of bits. The
fractional part is passed to the next symbol and is added to the bits required by the next
symbol. Also if the probability of a symbol P(TP} is large and hence, —log2P{ip) < < 1,
encoding the symbol may not produce any output. From above discussion, it is not
possible to detect the halving point by observing the encoding result of a single symbol.
However it is possible to detect it if the average output size per symbol is considered,
although some accuracy will be lost.

Figure 4.2: Example of average output size of 128 symbols
A rough estimation for the halving point can be obtained if the average bit per
symbol is calculated for each m input symbols. In the WNC implementation , the
output is byte-buffered and hence, there is an output only when the buffer is filled.
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Although this makes the analysis less accurate due to the delay in the output, it is still
possible to roughly detect the halving points. In Table 4.2 and 4.3, we give an example
of the calculation when m = 128. The block in which the halving occurs is marked
with *.

0.023438
0.023438
0.023438
0.023438
0.031250
0.015625
0.023438
0.023438

*0.023438
0.046875
0.046875
0.039062
0.046875
0.039062
0.039062
0.046875
0.039062
0.039062
0.039062
0.039062
0.039062
0.039062
0.031250
0.039062
0.039062
0.031250
0.039062
0.031250
0.039062

0.031250
0.031250
0.039062
0.031250
0.031250
0.031250
0.031250
0.031250
0.031250
0.031250
0.031250
0.031250
0.031250
0.031250
0.023438
0.031250
0.031250
0.023438
0.031250
0.031250
0.023438

0.031250
0.023438
0.023438
0.031250
0.023438
0.031250
0.023438
0.023438
0.023438
0.031250
0.023438
0.023438
0.023438
0.023438
0.023438
0.023438
0.023438
0.023438
0.023438
0.023438
0.023438

*0.023438
0.046875
0.046875
0.039062
0.046875
0.039062
0.039062
0.046875
0.039062
0.039062
0.039062
0.039062
0.039062
0.039062
0.031250
0.039062
0.039062
0.031250
0.039062
0.031250
0.039062

0.031250
0.031250
0.039062
0.031250
0.031250
0.031250
0.031250
0.031250
0.031250
0.031250
0.031250
0.031250
0.031250
0.031250
0.023438
0.031250
0.031250
0.023438
0.031250
0.031250
0.023438

0.031250
0.023438
0.023438
0.031250
0.023438
0.031250
0.023438
0.023438
0.023438
0.031250
0.023438
0.023438
0.023438
0.023438
0.023438
0.023438
0.023438
0.023438
0.023438
0.023438
0.023438

*0.023438
0.046875
0.046875
0.039062
0.046875
0.039062
0.039062
0.046875

Table 4.2: Average bits/symbol of 128 symbol block : bit-oriented output
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0.062500
0.000000
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000

BH attack

*0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.062500
0.000000

0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.000000
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0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.000000
0.062500

*0.000000
0.062500
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500

0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000

0.062500
0.000000
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.000000
0.062500
0.000000
0.000000

*0.062500
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.062500
0.000000
0.062500
0.062500

Table 4.3: Average bits/symbol of 128 symbol block : byte-buffered output
It can be seen that it is possible to find one or two blocks which are likely to
include the halving point. The result of the same test performed on byte-oriented
output implementation, ie. original WNC implementation , is given in Table 4.3. The
number of bits per symbol is either 0 or yfg = 0.0625, and so there is either no output
or one byte output per 128 symbols.
In this latter case detection of halving is less accurate but if the rate of producing
output bytes is carefully monitored, it will be possible to detect the halving point in a
way similar to bit-oriented output since there will be a sudden increase in the output
rate.

4.1.2

Attacks on the coder

It is necessary for an attacker to know the range of the coder to decrypt the message.
We give three attacks on the coder. The first attack uses attacker's encoder to discover
the range and the cost is

This is the cost of finding the high value. The second

one only discovers the low value of the range but can reduce the number of possible
values to 7. The last attack forces the range of the coder to take one of the two possible
values.
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The range of the coder changes as encoding proceeds and its value depends on the
encoded symbols' cumulative frequencies. Without the coder range, it is impossible to
decode a message even if the model is known. The encoder's output leaks information
about the model and the range, and the amount of information depends on the input
string and the state of the model.
Our proposed attacks on the coder use the following properties of the coder.
Property 1 If the same plaintext is encoded using two encoders which have the same
values for ho—lo and identical model, but have different values for /q, the difference
of the two output strings is equal to the difference between the two low values,
which will consists of 16 bits (because 16 bit integer arithmetic is used) followed
by zeros.
Property 2 If the cumulative probability of ^min is small, encoding the symbol produces a considerable length output which is very close to the low value used to
encode the symbol.
Property 3 If n bits are output, the least significant n bits of the high and low values
become known because they are filled with Is and Os for the high and low values,
respectively. If n is large, the number of unknown bits becomes small.
Property 4 If symbols with very small probabilities are continuously encoded, the
high and low pair has two possible values and in each case once the high and low
pair takes that value, it will stays at that value. (Table 4.6, Table 4.7, Table 4.8)
In the rest of this section, we describe several methods to find the range of the coder
when the model is known. Firstly we describe the attack using property 1. Then we
give two more attacks based on properties 2, and 3 together with 4. The latter attack
is particularly interesting as it produces only two alternatives for the range and hence
effectively allows the attacker to discover the range.
(1) Attack on the coder using properties of encoder's output
This attack uses Property 1 above. The assumptions are as follows.
• The attack is a chosen plaintext attack.
• The key is the initial range.
• The model is known.
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• The attacker has her/his own encoder and is able to initialize it.
Notice that the assumption that the model is known above is almost satisfied after
the synchronization of BH attack except for the frequency F(V'nxax). The method is as
follows.
Step 1 Encode a text and obtain the output o^. The text should be chosen to produce
an output considerably longer than 16 bits.
Step 2 To find range, set the low value to 0 and find possible high values. • The
most significant bit of hi and li should be different and it should not satisfy the
condition for mid-range buffering so h i - l i > 0x8000. The high value starts from
0x8000. Encoding the same text used in step 1 gives the output 02. Calculate
Oi - 02.
Since the offset of the correct range from the experimental one is 16 bits (d in
Fig.4.3), the most significant 16 bits of Oj - 02, denoted by [oj - 02]m, represents
the low value. The subsequent least significant bits of 01-02, denoted by [01-02]^,
must be 0 if /iq ~

is correctly evaluated. However due to various inaccuracies

of integer arithmetic [oi — 02]^ may not be 0 but will be a value very close to 0.
Step 3 Increment the high value by 1 and repeat the above Step 2 until [oi — 02
becomes 0 or very close to 0.

Figure 4.3: Relation between the difference of range and output
If such a range is found, even if it is not the correct one, it can be used to correctly
decode the message. Let u be [ i ^ r i ^ M j then

< {hi - li)F{il)') < {u +

l)F{iprnax)- ^(V'max) is constant and for a given F{ip') and u^ there are many possible
hi and k that satisfy the condition. Since the calculation of the new range only depends
on the previous range, once the range takes the correct value the sequence of symbols
that follow can be correctly decoded. The number of the valid ranges depends on the
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frequency of the symbol and the range, and in general, is not one. The cost of the
attack on WNC implementation is at most

This is because we only search for the

high value and the low value is fixed to 0. The high value is 16 bits and its MSB will
be 1 and so the number of the possible values for the high value is
( 2 ) Finding the low value from output
The following attack is based on Property 2. Assume that the mid-range buffering
does not occur. When a symbol at the bottom of the frequency table is encoded, the
high and low values are updated as (2.17) and ^
'

^

i'KWmax)

<

—

<

r[y}max)

^ (Vmax)

h i - l i is between 0x8000 and OxFFFF. If F(V'max) is around 16000, then 1 <
Assuming that encoding the symbol ip produces u bits of output, then
where M is a 16 bit value having the u MSB equal to the u MSB of

^

because
< 5.
m<l\<M

and the rest

equal to 1, while m is the same as M with 16 - u LSB equal to 0.
liu = 14, then M—m = 3 because M = * * * * * * * * * * * * * * i i and m = * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 0 0
and m <

< m + 3. Because

= h + L i ^ g ^ J we have h = l[ -

m — A < li < m -hS. Hence there are only 7 possible values for

and so

which can be derived

from the output as shown above.
( 3 ) Discovering the range
This part describes how Property 3 and Property 4 can discover the range. Assume
the model to be synchronized, using the symbol 0x00 for over-flooding and the symbols
are in ascending order in the table, ie. 0x00, 0x01, ... OxFF. The procedure is as follows.
1. After over-flooding and re-ordering, frequencies of all symbols except the one
used for halving are 2.
Then, cause another halving to make the frequency of each symbol equal to 1.
Send a message consisting of the symbol used to synchronize the model to make
Chi'^ma.x) close to the upper limit Cmax2. Use the following procedure to generate a long output :
i) Input symbol OxFF at the bottom of the frequency table. The symbol goes to
the second place in the table and the second symbol 0x01 moves to the bottom.
ii) Input symbol 0x01. The symbol goes to the third place in the frequency table
and the third symbol 0x02 is shifted to the bottom.
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in) Input symbol 0x02. The symbol goes to the fourth place in the frequency
table and the fourth symbol 0x03 moves to the bottom.
iv) Repeat as above for all symbols up to OxFE. This will give an attacker a long
enough output.
3. Try to decode the output using one of the ranges below and verify the decoding
result.
( a ) (0x0000,OxFFFF)
( b ) (0x4000,OxFFFF)

The reason that Step 3 above works is the following. If the last symbol in the table
is encoded, the output size would be
~ 12 bits when the total frequency is
close to 8000, and would be -log2j^ ^ 14 bits when the total is around 16000. If
14 bits are output, each high and low value is left-shifted by 14 bits and the lower 14
bits are filled by 1 for the high value and by 0 for the low value. The only unknown
is the first 2 bits. There are 4 possible combinations : that is, {l,h) = {(00, 10),
(00, 11), (01, 10), (01, 11)}. However, (01, 10) will cause the mid-range buffer
resulting in (0x0000,OxFFFF), and so there are only three possibilities for the range of
the next symbol. That is, (OxOOOO,OxBFFF), (0x0000,OxFFFF) and (0x4000,0xFFFF).
If the range is (0x0000,OxBFFF), the new range is calculated from (2.17) as given in
Table 4.6. Hence the range (0x0000,OxBFFF) changes into (0x4000,OxFFFF). Similarly,
the ranges (0x0000,OxFFFF) and (0x4000,OxFFFF) can be calculated as given in Table
4.7 and Table 4.8. Since both of these give the same values, there are only 2 possible
ranges. Once the range drops into one of them, the same output pattern is repeated.
That is, the range (0x0000,OxFFFF) repeats output pattern 00000000000001 and the
range (0x4000,OxFFFF) repeats output pattern 01100000000000.
A 14 bit output results in 2 possible ranges and a 12 bit output will result in 48
possible ranges and hence the number of possible ranges is greatly reduced.
Assume that the output size is n, then the number of the unknown bits of hi and is
216-u jjence after the output, the
MSB of hi and h must be different and so are
unknown. Now we have
x
possible hi and k pairs but some may satisfy
the condition of the mid-range buffering and if so, hi and li are left-shifted and LSB
of hi and k are filled by 1 and 0, respectively. As a result of the mid-range buffering,
new hi and U will be equal to those of the other pairs and the above procedure will be
repeated until hi and does not satisfy the condition of the mid-range buffering.
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We define group 1 as hi and k which does not satisfy the condition of the midrange buffering and group 1 < ^ < 4, is defined as (hiji) pairs which satisfy the
condition of the mid-range buffering and result in the values found in group g - 1
after the mid-range buffering occurs. The high/low values in group 1 is outside of
the mid-range (0x4000 to OxBFFF). If either of the high or low value belongs to this
group, no mid-range buffering occurs. The high or low values in group 2 may cause
the mid-range buffering but at most once, ie. 1 bit in the mid-range buffer. As a
result of the mid-range buffering, the value changes into one of the values in group 1.
Similarly, the high/low values in group 3 may cause the mid-range buffering at most
twice and after the mid-range buffering, the values change into the values in group 2.
For the values in group 4, at most three bits may go to the mid-range buffer and so
on.
Group Low values

1
2
3
4

0x0000,0x1000,0x2000,0x3000
0x4000,0x5000
0x6000
0x7000

High values

OxCFFF,OxDFFF,OxEFFF,OxFFFF
OxAFFF,OxBFFF
0x9FFF
0x8FFF

Table 4.4: Groups of ranges with 12 bit output
For a hi and pair, the one which has the lower number group determines how
many times the mid-range buffing occurs. The following tables shows the movement
of the higher number groups to the lower number groups.
Group 4 Group 3 Group 2 Group 1

0x7000

0x6000

0x4000
0x5000

OxAFFF
OxSFFF

0x9FFF

OxBFFF

0x0000
0x1000
0x2000
0x3000
OxCFFF
OxDFFF
OxEFFF
OxFFFF

Table 4.5: Changing ranges of mid-range buffering with 12 bit output

Cost of attack
In the WNC implementation , halving occurs when the total frequency reaches CmaxAt the beginning of the attack, frequencies are not known. For a the value F(ip)
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Low value
Initial value
After encoding
After output
Mid range buff.
Final value

0000
0000
0110
0010
0100

0000
0000
0000
0000
0000

High valué
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000

0000
0011
0000
0000
0000

1011
0000
1011
0111
1111

1111
0000
1111
1111
1111

1111
0000
1111
1111
1111

1111
0101
1111
1111
1111

Table 4.6: The change of the range (0x0000,0xBFFF) with 14
Initial value
After encoding
After output

Low value

High value

0000 0000 0000 0000
0000 0000 0000 0100
0000 0000 0000 0000

1111 1111 1111 n i l
0000 0000 0000 0111
nil nil nil
n n

Table 4.7: The change of the range (0x0000,OxFFFF) with 14 bit output
satisfies 1 < F(iP) < C^^ - N^y^boi - 1 ; ie. 1 < F{'il)) < 16127. To synchronize the
model, all F{il)) except F(V'niax) should be reduced to 1. Assuming that the attacker is
going to synchronize the model using symbol tp, and the frequency of another symbol
ip' is F(7p') = 16127 (and so all other frequencies are 1), log2l6127

14 halvings are

required to reduce F{ip') to 1. Hence, after at most 14 halvings any frequency can be
reduced to 1.
In the above case, after the first halving,

becomes L^^^^^^J =

=

8064 and F(V''max) = 8064 + N.ymboi - 1 + 1 = 8064 -h 256 + 1 = 8321. To cause
another halving, 16383 - 8321 + 1 = 8063 symbols must be sent. So in general, to
synchronize the model, at most a message of length 14 x 8063 = 112882 of symbols
is required.

After synchronization, 255 symbols for re-ordering and approximately

8000 symbols for another halving should be sent. To attack the coder, the small
probability of symbols are required. If the symbol at the bottom of the table is chosen,
the probability is Chi-^m^x) ^^^ when C/i('0max) is close to its maximum value, the
probability becomes close to the minimum and the output rate of 14 bits/symbol is
achieved. Another 8000 symbols will achieve this. Hence, the total number of required
symbols is 112882 + 255 + 8000 + 8000

130000. F(V'max) is unknown and there are

2® possible values for F(V'max) and the range of the coder will be one of the two values.
The pattern of the bit sequence of encoder's output is known and so the relationship
between a symbol and its encoded output is clear.
Notice that the attack on the coder to discover the range can be used on coderbased scheme in general. If the two consecutive ranges are known, the key information
that is used to narrow the range can be obtained.
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Initial value
After encoding
After output
Mid range buff.
Final value

Low value
0100 0000
0100 0000
0110 0000
0010 0000
0100 0000

0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
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0000
0011
0000
0000
0000

High
1111
0100
1011
0111
1111

valué
1111
0000
1111
1111
1111

1111
0000
1111
1111
1111

1111
0101
1111
1111
1111

Table 4.8: The change of the range (0x4000,OxFFFF) with 14 bit output

4.2

Attack on a combined scheme

The two schemes, ie. the model-based and the coder-based schemes, can be combined
together. An example of the combined scheme is Liu/Farrell/Boyd scheme 3.1.3. The
system can be attacked using a method similar to the attack on the model-based
system. The model can be modified into a known form by BH attack and the secret in
the coder can be discovered by the attacks described in the previous sections.
In this section we describe the attack on the Liu/Farrell/Boyd scheme as an example
of the combined scheme. The attack has two steps and can reduce the key space to
In the first step the attacker uses BH attack to take control over the model by
sending a chosen message and finding an approximate value for the halving point, and
in the second step he uses a method of discovering the shrinking factors by encoding
symbols of small frequencies.

4.2.1

Outline of the attack

The relationship between an input symbol, the model and the coder is ij the model
is modified according to an input symbol and iij the coder encodes a symbol, which
is represented by two consecutive cumulative frequencies given by the model. Once
the model is known, the coder can be controlled using the knowledge of the model.
BH attack modifies the model into a known form.

The weakness of BH attack is

that if halving occurs during the re-ordering procedure, the attack fails. The attack
strengthens BH attack using the method which enables detecting of the halving point.
The secret parameters of the coder, /i» and li, can be controlled by encoding symbols
of small frequencies. This is possible if the model is known. From (2.18), when output
size is u bits, the number of unknown bits after output is 16 — li because the least
significant u bits are filled with the known values. If u is large, the number of the
unknown bits becomes small. The maximum of u is given by
16383

14

(4.9)
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and hence, the unknown bits of hi and li are reduced to 2. Using the knowledge of the
model it is possible to selectively encode symbols of small frequencies. Furthermore, it
is known that Ch{iprnax) is maximized right before halving.
The assumptions are as follows.
1. The scheme is Liu/Farrell/Boyd scheme.
2. The implementation is based on Neal/Witten/Cleary implementation. The output is byte-buffered, ie. 8 bit blocks are output. We do not consider any I/O
buffering of s t d i o , which may be used by the operating system since the scheme
does not explicitly take into account the blocking and the buffering as part of the
system. The effect of the blocking on the attack is discussed in Section 4.2.4.
3. The attack is a chosen plaintext attack. The attacker has access to the encoder
and can see the output. The attack does not require any reset of the system.
The steps of the attack are
Step 1 i) Over-flood the model by sending a long enough message consisting of single
symbol ip and observe the change of the output length per symbol. Obtain a
rough estimate of the halving point. Details of how to detect the halving point
is described in Section 4.1.1.
ii) Re-order the symbols in the frequency table. At this stage, the model becomes
known to the attacker. That is, the frequencies of all the symbols except ip at
the top of the table becomes 2.
Step 2 i) Send a message consisting of the symbol

again to cause a halving and

to make Chii^) close to Cmax? ie. 16383. After this, the frequencies of all the
symbols except

at the top of the table become 1 again.

ii) Repeatedly send the symbols '0min at the bottom of the frequency table and
obtain the output. There are 255 symbols with frequency 1. Encoding these
symbols produces a considerably long output. Details are given in Section 4.2.3.
Hi) Identify the output bit sequence for each of the 255 symbols by analyzing the
bit patterns. Details are given in Section 4.2.4.
iv) Calculate the lower shrinking factors from the bit sequence. Details are given
in Section 4.2.3.
v) Find the 128 bit random sequence using the lower shrinking factors found.

4.2.
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In the following, we describe how to detect the halving point and analyze the
security that the shrinking factors provide, followed by a method to find the shrinking
factors and the random bit sequence.

4.2.2

Security of the shrinking factors

This section analyzes the security that is provided by the shrinking mechanism in the
coder and describes a method to find the shrinking factors.
Assumptions are as follows.
1. The model is known. This means observation is done after synchronization of
the model.
2. Ck(ip^^x) is close to

¿6. 16383.

3. The frequencies of the symbols other than the one at the top of the table are 1.
4. The first bit of output bit sequence as a result of encoding a symbol is known.
5. There is no mid-range buffering.
When a symbol with a probability close to

is encoded, if there is no shrink-

ing, the output length is approximately 14 bits. This follows from (4.9). The extranarrowing shrinks the range by at most approximately 80% and so the output length
will be " ^ 2 0 . 8 ^ ^

14.3 bits. This affects the required number of bits for a sym-

bol. For example, right before halving and without shrinking, the required number
of bits for tpmax is

0.9844.

If it is shrinked by 80%, the required length is

(0.9844 X 0.8) = 0.3446 bits. In fact, extra-narrowing gives two possible ranges
for each symbol, one of which will be selected depending on the pseudo-random bit. Although for a single character, the extra-narrowing can disturb detection of the halving
point but if the average length over blocks of 128 characters is calculated, the variation
in the range can be averaged and the halving point can be detected.
From (2.18), if the output size is 14 bits, the high and low values are h'! =
** 11111111111111 and I'l = **00000000000000 respectively. From the conditions
for the output in Section 2.5, i) h" and I" do not have any common most significant bit
and a) the interval defined by h" and l" does not satisfy 0x4000 < interval < OxCOOO.
There are three pairs of h" and I" which satisfy these conditions; possible pairs are,
(OxFFFF, 0x4000), (OxFFFF, 0x0000) and (OxBFFF, 0x0000).

4.2.
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h'- and I'/ are narrowed down by either of the two sets of shrinking factors according
to the 128 bit random sequence. Hence, there are six possible ranges in Step 1 of
Section 3.1.3. Each of the six ranges becomes one of the three possible ranges after the
output procedure in Step 2 in Section 3.1.3.

Procadure

Enccxle

(hi ,h

-o
-o
--0
-o
-o

Output

{hi'Jf )

)

^ ^

Shrink

{hi'\li")

—o.-/

—
,

(OxBFFF, 0x0000

( Oxl-hH-, 0x4000

—

—O"--

<g::

(OxhhhJh . 0x0000

Figure 4.4: One cycle of encoding procedure

Weakness in the coder
Assume o^ is a 16 bit value, where its 14 MSB are the output and the rest is 0, and
there is no mid-range buffering. Then, Oi is very close to

because

given in

(2.17), is very small. So the attacker can derive I'- from the output Oi if a symbol of
small frequency is encoded and mid-range buffering does not occur. Also the high and
low values in Step 2 of Section 3.1.3 are known by the attacker.

4.2.3

A method to derive the shrinking factors from the output

If after the synchronization of the model a certain size sequence consisting of the symbol
at the top of the frequency table is sent to the encoder, another halving will occur and
the model will take a form in which frequencies of all symbols except the one at the
top of the frequency table are 1 and C7/i('V^max) is close to Cmax- At that moment,
the cumulative frequencies Ch{'^min) and Ci{iJrnin) for the symbol at the bottom of
the frequency table, V'min, are 2 and 1, respectively. This is because there is an EOF
symbol below ipndn- From (2.17) in Step 2 of Section 4.2.1, the high and low values h\
and /J, after encoding the symbol i/'min are calculated as.

L/

7 , 2(/it - Ij)
^/»(V'max)

hi-li
C',,(V'xnax)

(4.10)
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where Ch(ipmajz) is close to CmaxProm (3.1) and (4.10),

When

-

^

=

+ r

C/,(V'max)

- M - ^^ +
M "

1 -

+

- ^^

+

-

+

+ 1
" ( 4 . 1 1 )

is close to 16383, it is known by the attacker that the length of

encoder's output is 14 bits and that the high and low values h'l and

take one of the

values in Section 4.2.2.
P a t t e r n 1 hi = OxBFFF, h = 0x0000,

P a t t e r n 2 hi = OxFFFF, li = 0x4000,
=

0X4000+ OxBFFFs,, +

=

0 x 4 0 0 0 + 0xBFFFe, +

5 i B | p z )

(4.13)

P a t t e r n S hi = OxFFFF, li = 0x0000,
=

OxFFFF£/,+

0.8001 <

Shj - eij

Ox1FFFE(£:,,j - sij)
16383

From (3.1),

. .

0xl7FFE(eH,-e,,)

^ —

16383

< 0.9999
.

.
-

16383

OxlFFFE(.M-e,,)
^ —

16383

7
—

'

= 3

(4.15)

From (4.12), (4.13), (4.14) and (4.15), it is shown that the effect o i s h j - S i j is small.
Define a as

where ^ = {OxlFFFE, OxlTFFE, OxFFFF, OxBFFF} and assume

that there is no mid-range buffering, and 0,4.1 is a 16 bit value, where its most significant
14 bits is the output and the rest is 0. Because the output Oi+i is very close to /J^j, sij
can be shown as follows.
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P a t t e r n 1 hi = OxBFFF, k = 0x0000,
Oj+i w OxBFFFe:»,- + a and Sn « ^ ^
^^
^
^
OxBFFF
P a t t e r n 2 hi = OxFFFF,

(4.16)
^
^

= 0x4000,

Oi+i « 0x4000 + OxBFFFs/,- + a and eu « ^^^^^^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ — ^
^
^
OxBFFF

(4.17)
^
^

P a t t e r n 3 hi = OxFFFF, h = 0x0000,
Oi+i
»+1

OxFFFFeu + a and Su «
0
0
OxFFFF

From (4.15), ^j^^rpp < 0.0001 and

^^^—-

^

(4.18)
^

< 0.0001. So the lower shrinking factor

£ij can be accurately calculated from the output.
There are three possible patterns of the high and low values and there may be
0.0001 error in the calculation of the lower shrinking factor from above, so the cost of
obtaining the lower shrinking factor is 3 x 2. Notice that

in P a t t e r n 2 is equal

to Oi+i + 0x4000 in P a t t e r n 1.
Now the lower shrinking factor eij is given and from (4.12), (4.13) and (4.14), the
upper shrinking factor can be calculated as follows.
P a t t e r n 1 hi = OxBFFF, h = 0x0000,
16383

P a t t e r n 2 hi = OxFFFF, h = 0x4000,
ens =

+ ^ ^ ( / U i - 0x4000 - OxBFFFey)
^'i +

-

OxBFFF

-

(4.20)

P a t t e r n 3 hi = OxFFFF, U = 0x0000,
16383
«
However, the terms

% +
and

^

\

OxFFFF.,,)

(4.21)

are very small and o^+i is the approxima-

tion of I'i^i and so the accurate upper shrinking factor is not given by this calculation.
Hence, to find the upper shrinking factor, brute-force is to be used. The cost is approximately 2^° because the range for the factor is between 0.9000 and 0.9999.
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Analysis of the output bit sequence

To derive the shrinking factors from the output, it is necessary to identify the output
bit sequence for a symbol in the whole output.

This section analyzes the output

bit sequence, the relationship between a symbol encoded and its resulting output bit
sequence, and shows a method to identify the bit sequence produced by encoding a
symbol.
There are two factors which hide the direct relationship between an encoded symbol
and its output bit sequence. One is the byte buffering, that is, 8 bit blocking of output,
and the second is mid-range buffering. Byte buffering is required for the file I/O in
the software implementation and merges two consecutive encoding results. It causes
the delay in the output but does not change the sequence of the output bits. The
mid-range buffering occurs when the range is between OxCOOO and 0x4000. As a result
of encoding a symbol ipi, some bits may be stored in the mid-range buffer and the final
output is produced at the beginning of the output of the following symbol, ipi+i- If
the mid-range buffer, as a result of encoding symbol ipi, contains n bits, then n bits
are inserted between the first bit and the second bit of the output of the symbol i^i+iThese n bits are opposite of the first bit, ie. if the first bit is 0, the n bits are all 1
and if it is 1, the n bits are all 0. Hence it is necessary to identify the inserted bits to
correctly derive the low value from the output.
Method to identify the output bit sequence
After synchronization of the model, assume that the total frequency is close to C^
'max)
ie. 16383, and symbols of frequency = 1 are encoded. The following properties of the
output bit sequence are useful in finding the beginning of a symbol in the output.
1. If the first two bits are the same, there is no mid-range buffering. This is because
the inserted n bits are always opposite of the first bit.
2. The first bit of the output is always 0.
From (4.12), (4.13), (4.14) and (4.15), the range just before the output is as
follows.
Pattern 1 hi = OxBFFF, k = 0x0000,
0x0004 <

< 0x1334

0x0002 <

< 0x1331

(4.22)
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= 0x4000,

0x4004 <

< 0x5334

0x4002 <

< 0x5331

(4.23)

= 0x0000,

0x0006 <

/I'.^i

0x0003 <

< 0xl99A
< 0x1996

(4.24)

All the above ranges produce an output which starts with a 0.
3. The same bit sequences repeatedly appear in the output. This is because there
are only 6 possible ranges and if there is no mid-range buffering, the same range
produces the same bit sequence. So with no mid-range buffering there will be 6
different bit sequence patterns in the output. However, if the mid-range buffering
occurs, the content of the buffer will affect the output during the output of the
following symbol and so there may be more than 6 patterns in the output.
The method to find the beginning of the bit sequence for a symbol is as follows
(Figure 4.5).
1. Choose a bit 0 in the output and assume it is the beginning of the sequence.
If the length of the output for a symbol is 14 bits, there is a start bit in any 14
consecutive bits of the output. If 7 bits are 0, there are 7 possible start bits.
2. If the bit after the chosen bit is also 0, there has been no mid-range buffering.
Notice that since a 14 bit sequence includes a start bit, there must be at least
one 0.
3. If <7 bits after the chosen bit are 1, the first i bits, 0 < i < a, oi a bits may be
the result of mid-range buffering. Remove i bits from the output and construct
the sequence without mid-range buffering.
4. Assume that the sequence of 14 bits without mid-range buffering obtained above
is the output for a symbol and calculate the lower shrinking factor. Using the
method given in Section
each possible range.

4.2.3,

calculate the value for lower shrinking factor for
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01110100101101110100110 i= 0
i=1
i= 2
i= 3

0111010010110111
0110100101101110
0101001011011101
0010010110111010
i=0
i=1

010 010110111010 0
0001011011101001

i=0

0 010110111010 011

Figure 4.5: Bit patterns in an output without mid-range buffering
Since there are 3 possible ranges, 3 calculations per symbol is required to obtain
the lower shrinking factor. The factor may include error but it is no larger than
0.0001. Hence the cost to find the factor is 3 x 2.
5. Verify the result using an encoder. Encode a symbol of frequency

= 1 with the

total frequency close to 16363, applying the lower shrinking factor obtained in the
above step. Compare the result with the original bit sequence. If the shrinking
factor is correct, it should produce exactly the same sequence as the original.
If it produces a different sequence, it is either because the assumption of the start
bit is wrong or the shrinking factor is wrong. Then change i in step 3 and repeat
the above procedure.
From our experiments, for the sequence produced by encoding symbols at the bottom of the frequency table, the number of mid-range buffered bits is generally small.
Hence the output produced by encoding one of these symbols, including mid-range
buffering, will not be much larger than 14 bits. In a bit sequence of slightly longer
than 14 bits, if there are 7 possible start bits, ie. Os, and each of them produces
1 < J < 7 , possible bit sequences because of the removing of the possible mid-range
buffered bits, there are

possible sequences for a symbol. Each sequence is ver-

ified by the above procedure (Figure 4.6). When the sequence for the first symbol is
determined, it automatically determines the bit sequence for the next symbol in the
output and results in a chain of possible bit sequences which grows like a tree. If the
next sequence does not satisfy the conditions, ie. i) it does not start with 0, ii) the
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Figure 4.6: Algorithm to find the start bit for a symbol in an output
mid-range buffered bits that are inserted into the output of the next symbol result in a
conflicting number, or in) applying the shrinking factor does not result in the expected
sequence, then the sequence is wrong and hence the branch is pruned and does not
grow further.
Once one of the lower shrinking factors is found, the 128 bit random sequence can
be found by using the encoder, to encode symbols of small frequencies in a way similar
to that used in the verification of the result. By using the lower shrinking factor to
encode the symbols, all parameters, including the high and low values and the size
of the mid-range buffering, can be found. If the experimental results differ from the
original sequence, the original bit sequence is analyzed in the same way and the other
lower shrinking factor needs to be calculated. Once the two lower shrinking factors
are known, the 128 bit random sequence can be found by applying either of the two
shrinking factors. From our experiments, it appears that the verification process, ie.
the comparison between the experimental results using the lower shrinking factor found
and the original bit sequence, is sensitive to the output size of the encoding of a symbol.
When the output size is smaller than 14 bits, the verification fails. Hence the sum of
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Conclusion

all the frequencies, Ch(ipmax)^ must be large enough to produce 14 bit output for each
symbol.

4.2.5

Cost of the attack

The cost of finding the beginning of output bit sequence for a symbol is at most
14

2^-® and the cost of calculating the lower shrinking factor is 3 x 2 i^i

To verify

the lower shrinking factor, it is necessary to encode a symbol using the upper shrinking
factor, which is unknown. However, the influence of the upper shrinking factor is very
small and so it is only sufficient to only try the maximum, ie. 9999, the minimum, ie.
9000, and a few values in between. The total cost is

+ 9 where 6 is the cost for the

verification.
The unknown part of the key is only the two upper shrinking factors, each of which
could take a value from 0.9000 to 0.9999. Hence, the attack reduces the unknown key
to

2^° X 2^° =

4.3
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Conclusion

As shown above, there are various methods of exploiting properties of arithmetic coding
to attack an arithmetic coding encryption system. The changes in the length of the
output gives information about halvings. Once the model is under control, the coder
can also be controlled using the knowledge of the model. Encoding takes the cumulative
frequencies, the total frequency and the high and low values as parameters. Encoder's
output which can be seen as a value, leaks information about these parameters, and so
can be used to determine the state of the model and the coder. To protect the system,
these properties should be carefully hidden from an attacker.

Chapter 5
Protection against attacks
As can be seen in the previous chapters, there are various methods to attack arithmetic coding encryption schemes. Since different attacks use different properties of
the schemes, different protection methods are required. In this chapter we first analyze properties that are used in the attacks, then propose various protection strategies
against the attacks and examine their effectiveness. The strategies are i) periodic reset/initialization strategy in which the model is periodically reset/initialized during
the encoding of a message, ii) random halving point and in) extra-narrowing which
is used in LFB scheme, iv) higher precision for the model and the coder and v) the
higher order of the model. Then we propose new methods, ie. blocking, XORing and
permutation of output bits, and demonstrate how each can add security to a system.

5.1

The properties used in the attacks

Different attacks use different properties of arithmetic coding. Although each may not
reduce security to a large extent but by combining more than one method, it is possible
to dramatically reduce the security of the system. In this section, we give an overview
of the attacks and the properties, and examine how they are used in the attacks. The
common methods used in the attacks are as follows.

5.1.1

Repeated experiments

LBD attack uses repeated experiments with the encoder. Repeated experiments allow
the information about the secret, ie. the model, to be extracted while a single experiment will not give enough information to break a system. If a system goes back to
the same state, ie. the initial model, by a reset, it can be repeatedly investigated for
different input messages and hence more and more secret information is leaked. The
weakness of the system is that it goes back to the same state and so an attacker has
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more opportunity to investigate the system.

5.1.2

Controlling the model by an input message

In BH attack, an input message is used to modify the model into a known form. The
attack is divided into two steps. The first step is to modify the frequencies of the
symbols into specific values. The second step is to arrange symbols in a specific order
in the model. After this step the model is completely known to the attacker.
Ordering the symbols is not a theoretical requirement for arithmetic coding but is
used for less processing time. Obviously if the model does not use an ordered frequency
table, BH attack is only successful to modify the frequencies and not the order of the
symbols. However this will significantly slow down the processing speed.
If a chosen plaintext attack is used, an attacker can choose a message which updates
the model into an intended form. Since an adaptive model is updated based on an input
message, any adaptive system can be attacked by this type of chosen plaintext attack.

5.1.3

Controlling the coder by an input message

In strengthened BH attack and the attack against LFB scheme, an input message is
used to control the coder. If a symbol of a small probability is encoded, a long bit
sequence is output. This means that the same number of bits are removed from the
high and low values and the removed bits in the high and low values are filled by known
values, ie. 1 and 0, respectively. Hence the secret part of the high and low values are
reduced by the number of output bits. If a few bits are unknown, there are only few
possible values that the high and low values can take and so it is possible to force the
high and low values to take specific values. This attack is only possible if the model
is known because it is necessary for an attacker to know which symbols have small
probabilities.

5.1.4

Analysis of the output considered as a real number
value

In the attack against LFB scheme, the shrinking factors are calculated from the output.
Using the method in Section 5.1.3, a long output is produced by using a symbol of small
probability. The high and low values will take one of the few possible values and the
result of encoding a symbol is obtained as an output. Since the encoding calculations
are simple, it is easy to calculate the shrinking factor from these values.
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In the attack on the coder (Section 4.1.2), the analysis is performed on the output
by considering it as a real number value. If two encoders having the same model
but different initial high and low values encode the same message, there is a certain
relationship between the two resulting outputs. If the high and low values of one of
the encoders is known, those of the other one can be recovered by comparing the two
outputs.
The output is the result of a calculation that uses cumulative frequencies of symbols
and the range. The calculations corresponding to the encoding of a single symbol
and updating of the model, are very simple. A message is encoded by repeating this
calculation. Encoder's output is a real number between 0 and 1, which represents
the interval of the message. Since the output is a real value, it is possible to apply
operations such as addition and subtraction to the output. Although the inverse of
the calculation which produces the output from a large number of input symbols is
complex and hence expensive and difficult to solve, the calculation for a single symbol,
same as the calculation performed in the attack on LFB scheme, is simple and can be
easily used in the attacks.

5.1.5

Analysis on the output size

The change of the output length per symbol can be used to detect the halving points.
The probability of a symbol directly affects the length of the output. Halving causes
noticeable change in the probabilities of symbols when the same symbol is repeatedly
sent to the encoder, and so results in noticeable change in the output length.

5.1.6

Properties exploited to attack systems

From the above discussion, we can summarize the properties used in the attacks. They
are :
1. Reset to the same state
2. Adaptiveness of the model
3. Ordering of symbols in the frequency table
4. Replacement of output bits of the high and low values by known values
5. Relationship between the probability of a symbol and the output length
6. Simplicity of encoding calculation
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Noting the properties used in the attacks, to provide protection against the attacks,
the following strategies can be used.

5.2.1

Reset/initialization

It is obvious from the above observation that after reset, a system should not return
to the same state. That is, a reset should not be limited to default values. Rather,
non-key parameters of the system must be changed in every reset. That is, resetting
should result in a slightly different range each time. This will protect against attacks
which attempt to obtain information about the key by repeated experiment on the
same encoder state.
In the model-based scheme, it is possible to initialize the model when a new message
is encoded. If input messages with the same probability distribution are consecutively
encoded, initialization results in a drop in the compression ratio as all previous adaptation of the model is lost. If the model is used as a key, the model is randomly chosen
and it is very unlikely that the model represents the probability distribution of the
message that is to be encoded. Hence, the compression ratio for the first part of the
message will be worse than the case that the initial model matches the probability
distribution of the message. Cleary et al estimate that for English text 1,000 bytes will
be enough for the model to adapt.
To protect against BH attack, Lim et al suggested periodic initialization of the
model. However as they pointed out, if the initialization period is short, the compression ratio will be dropped.
To initialize the encoder, because of the large number of required key bits, a pseudo
random number generator (PRNG) can be used, and the key will be the seed value for
the PRNG. During the initialization, the seed of the PRNG is loaded and the output
of the P R N G is used to initialize the model and the range. In each reset, the PRNG
output is used to reset non-key parameters of the system. If the same seed is used in
the transmitter and the receiver and resets in the two are synchronized, encoding and
decoding will be correctly performed.
Transmission errors may result in a loss of synchronization between the encoder
and the decoder. In such a case, the reset of non-key parameters may not be sufficient
and re-initialization of models may be needed because as a result of decoding a bit
sequence which is changed by the transmission errors the decoder's model may be in
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a state different from the encoder's state. To initialize the encoder and the decoder
using the PRNG output, the initialization of the model and non-key parameters in
the encoder and in the decoder must be from the same part of the PRNG output
bit sequence. The condition above must be satisfied regardless of the initialization
algorithm used, otherwise the decoder cannot correctly decode the encoded messages.
^ Since the encoder and the decoder share the same seed for the PRNG and consume
the same amount of the PRNG output for each reset and initialization, they will
regain the synchronization after transmission errors by the initialization. To regain the
synchronization it is important that the encoder and the decoder are simultaneously
initialized and to achieve this, an appropriate error control strategy will be needed.

5.2.2

Randomizing the halving periods

BH proposed to randomly choose Cmax- We note, as shown above, that detection of
the halving point will not be affected by the randomization as the halving points can
be directly detected from the output and successful re-ordering is guaranteed as long
as a halving point is correctly detected.
However, the attack to reduce the secret in the coder (Section 4.1.2) may be disturbed. The attack requires the small probability symbols to produce long enough
outputs and hence a small number of unknown bits in the high and low values. It is
best if the attack is used right before a halving to minimize the number of unknown
bits in the high and low values. This is because when Ch(iJma.x) is maximized, the
probability of a symbol is minimized. If a halving occurs before the start of the attack, Ch{ipm^x) is relatively small and hence, the probabilities of symbols are not small
enough to produce a long output. Although it is possible to run the procedure before
maximizing

the output size is smaller and hence the number of unknown

bits in the high and low values is larger and the attack becomes more expensive. Once
the attacker successfully decrypts the communication (by modifying Ch(ipraa.x)), it will
be possible to adjust her/his decoder to the changes in the halving period.
The impact of this strategy on the compression ratio can be examined by noting
that compression ratio depends on the halving period used. The shorter the halving
period is the quicker the latest statistics becomes dominant in the model. When a
halving occurs, all frequencies are halved and hence each symbol in the previous part
of a message is counted as 0.5 while each symbol in the latest part is counted as 1
^The details of the reset/initialization algorithms are not described in this thesis. The detailed
analysis will be required to achieve the secure reset/initialization.
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and so the latest part becomes dominant in the model. If the probability distribution
of symbols does not change through the whole message, the halving period will not
have much influence on the compression ratio. However, for a message with changing
distribution, the compression ratio will depend on how fast the latest distribution
becomes dominant in the model. In other words the halving period determines the
speed of adaptation of the model. The optimal period varies with messages and if the
period is randomly chosen, it is unlikely that it is optimal for a message. Hence this
strategy restricts the optimal choice of the halving period.
Examples of compression ratios with different halving periods are shown in Table
5.1. The files are from Calgary/Canterbury text compression corpus [WB89]. In the
initial model, all frequencies are set to 1.

For English text sources, larger halving

periods results in better compression but for the object files and the source codes, if
the periods are larger than certain values, reduction in the ratios will be reduced. For
o b j l file, the best compression is achieved at C^ax == 1,000 and the compression ratio
drops by about 7.5 % when C^ax = 16,000. Similarly, o b j 2 file is best compressed when
C'max = 2,000 and has about 2.5 % drop in compression ratio when C^ax = 16,000.
This could be because object files will have specific structures, such as references to
external entries, static data and instructions and so it is quite likely that each part
has different probability distribution of symbols. The quicker the model adapts to the
source statistics, the better the compression ratio will be. In such cases, the halving
period will have influence on the compression ratio.
Halving period
File

Size

Contents

500

1,000

2,000

4,000

8,000

16,000

bib
bookl

111261
768771

English text
English text

6.144
5.551

5.625
4.960

5.405
4.724

5.304
4.619

5.256
4.569

5.234
4.547

geo

102400

Geophysical data

5.904

5.701

5.657

5.652

5.654

5.656
5.968
6.067
5.234

objl
obj2
progc
progp
gs

21504

Compiled code for Vax

5.743

5.551

5.618

5.743

5.866

246814

Compiled code for Mac

6.219

5.936

5.891

5.929

5.997

C source code
Pascal source code

5.910

5.457

5.297

5.617

5.131

4.962

5.243
4.900

5.227
4.890

4.894

Compiled code for Linux

5.983

5.709

5.669

5.705

5.763

5.827

39611
49379
689352

Table 5.1: Halving periods and compression ratios (bits/symbol)

5.2.3

Extra-narrowing of interval

This method is used by LFB scheme and was claimed to be resistant against BH
attack. However, as long as it is possible to detect halving points, this mechanism can
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not avoid over-flooding and re-ordering and so it cannot prevent the attack. The aim
of this approach is to add extra-complexity to the coder and to make synchronization
of the coder more difficult. However as shown in the previous chapter, it is possible
to largely reduce the attacking cost and hence the method does not provide strong
security.
The cost of this strategy is nearly doubling the processing time of the input data.
This is because extra-narrowing is equivalent to encoding another symbol and the
encoding procedure takes the major part of the processing time.

5.2.4

Higher precision of the model and the coder

Using 32 bit integer arithmetic for the frequencies in the model will allow setting of
-^max to much larger values and hence longer strings for over-flooding are required.
This provides protection against the BH attack. For example, if F^ax = 268,000, 000,
a string of more than 100,000,000 symbols is required to cause a halving. This will
increase security but will affect the compression ratio because increase in halving period
means slower adaptation to source statistics which could drop the compression ratio.
More detail is given in Section 5.2.2.
To increase coder's security, higher precision for the high and low values can be
used. Assume the number of bits for the high and low values is Bj.. If the smallest
probability in the model is Pniin, then the maximum length of the output for a symbol
is -/o^2-Pniin bits. During the output procedure the output bits are removed from the
high and low values and -log^.P^in bits of the high and low values are filled with known
values, ie. 1 and 0. So the number of unknown bits in the high and the low values is
Br + log'?. -Pmin. In the case of WNC implementation , the number of unknown bits is
16 — 14 = 2. If the high and the low values are 32 bits and the same model is used, the
number of unknown bits becomes 32 - 14 = 18 bits. In this case, even if the symbols
of the smallest probability are sent, the high and the low values can take 2^® possible
values and hence coder's security is increased. The cost of employing higher precision
is additional calculation time.

5.2.5

Higher order of the model

To avoid BH attack, the length of the sequence required for synchronization can be
increased. A method of increasing this length is to use higher order models such as
PPM models. If the sequence is long enough (compared with the size of most messages).
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then by using a reset that is automatically invoked after a certain length input, the
attacker will be effectively stopped from synchronizing the model. If the reset interval
is chosen longer than most messages, it will not have any effect on the data compression
performance.
Irvine [Irv95] showed a method of attacking PPM system using BH approach. In this
attack it is necessary to produce all possible nodes of the tree. To protect against this
attack he suggested a method of pruning the model using a pseudo-random sequence.
An important consideration in using higher order models is the required memory
and processing time. Although using higher order models will result in better compression ratio, because of memory and speed requirements it might not be suitable for
many applications.
In general requiring longer sequences to control the model implies slower adaptation
of the model to an input. Since the initial model is randomly chosen (key), it may be
far from optimal for an incoming message and so slower adaptation will result in a drop
in compression ratio.

5.2.6

XORing the output with pseudo-random sequence

Various methods can be used to protect against mathematical analysis of the output
and hiding the true output of the encoder. A simple method is to mask the output by
XORing the output with a pseudo-random sequence. The seed of the pseudo-random
generator is part of the key and the encoder's output is XORed with the sequence.
Key
Initial Model
Seed
Decoder

Encoder
Random
•„ip. Number

T

Coder
Model

Predictions

1

Random
Number
Coder
Predictions

Model

Figure 5.1: Encryption of output using random number sequence
This system is attractive because the PRNG need not be cryptographically strong
and a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) will suffice. This is because the coder output
is compressed and hence has very high entropy and the role of PRNG is to simply mask
this output. This means that masking does not introduce large computation cost and
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no notable degradation of speed will occur. However the weakness of this system is that
if the true encoder output is known, the pseudo-random sequence can be revealed and
in the case of LFSR systems, the seed of PRNG will be determined. As shown above,
one of the proposed attacks (Section 4.1.2) produces a known output bit sequence and
so can be used to find the output of LFSR and derive the seed.

5.2.7

Blocking

Another method of providing protection against attacks is blocking that is controlled
by the encryption system. That is, an output will be released as blocks of bits where
the size of the block is fixed and determined by the combined encryption-compression
software. Blocking muddles the relationship between input symbols and the output
bit string and makes the analysis of the output more difficult. However, if it is the
sole method of protection, the added strength is not sufficient. This is because the
relationship between the last output symbol and the last block is clear and it is known
that all or part of the substring for the last symbol will be in the block. More security
can be obtained by permuting bits in a block.

5.2.8

Permutation

Using permutation of encoder's output, it is possible to hide the properties of the
output and the relationship between input and output, and so it is more difficult to
do the inverse calculation of encoding. For the permutation to be executed on a fixed
size output block, the output will be buffered and hence, blocking is applied.
The weakness is that if the true output bits are known, they may leak information
about how each bit is permuted. For example, the attack in Section 4.1.2 can produce
an output of known bit patterns and because the patterns are known and they are
repeated in the output, it could leak information about the permutation.
XORing can hide the true information so if it is combined with permutation, it will
give better security to the system. The advantage of this method is that it is possible
to have a less expensive and more secure system by combining simple algorithms.
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Conclusion

Attacks use different properties and so protection mechanisms vary with attacks. Adding
security in general reduces the compression ratio but the amount of reduction depends on the chosen method. Repeated experiments can be easily avoided by reset/initialization strategy. Attacks that use adaptiveness of the model are more difficult to avoid without sacrificing compression ratio. By applying higher precision for
the frequencies in the model, the cost of the attack will grow to impractical level but
the speed of adaptation will drop. Higher order models possibly provide better security
but with much larger memory and to some extent computational requirement. This
limits their applications. Though higher precision for the coder does not provide strong
enough security by itself, combined with other methods, it may result in reasonably
good security. The cost may not be a problem because 32 bit architecture, and hence
64 bits for the result (multiplying two 32 bit numbers), is becoming common in CPU
technologies. Analysis of encoder's output can be avoided by hiding the true output.
The security of XOR/permutation/blocking is discussed in the following chapter.

Chapter 6
Comments on integrated encryption after
compression schemes
In arithmetic coding encryption systems the secret key consists of the model and the
coder, individually or together. The model has a larger number of variables (frequency
counts of the symbols) than the coder (the high and low values). Although there are
some additional variables in the LFB scheme, the model has many more variables. Most
of the parameters change dynamically with an input message and security is achieved
by hiding the initial values of the parameters. In this chapter, we analyze security
of the methods discussed in the previous chapter. Firstly we introduce two general
models of hiding compressed output. Then we compare the two models when i) pure
compression followed by encryption is used, and ii) a secure compression algorithm is
used. Finally we summarize the result.

6.1

Methods to hide encoder's output

Encoder's output leaks information. To achieve strong security, it is necessary to hide
the true output of the encoder. As shown in the previous chapter, XOR, permutation
and blocking could possibly enhance the security. In this section, we analyze each of
these techniques and examine their properties.

6.1.1

Models to hide the true output

Type 1 This is the simple combination of compression and encryption algorithms.
The encryption is performed after compressing the input. In this case encryption
algorithm input depends on the output of the compression and hence, indirectly
on an input message.
Type 2 In this system encoder's output is masked by the output of the encryption
part. The assumed encryption algorithm is a pseudo-random generater which
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Type 1

Type 2

Figure 6.1: Models to hide the true output
produces mask bits independent of the input message.
We assume that the data compression algorithm is an adaptive arithmetic coding
and its performance in both cases is the same.

Also in both cases the encryption

algorithm provides the same level of security and has the same cost. We also assume
that the compression algorithm does not provide security, ie. it is a pure compression
algorithm. The encryption is assumed to be a block cipher.

6.2

Comparison between Type 1 and Type 2

6.2.1

Speed

In terms of throughput, both systems are equivalent. However, Type 1 introduces a
larger delay in producing the output from the input.
Let Scomp and Tcomp be the average required time to compress a symbol and to output
a block, respectively. Let S^nc and r^nc be the average required time to encrypt a block
and to output an encrypted block, respectively. We assume that the compression and
the encryption can be executed in parallel in Type 2 system. In Type 1 system, the
encryption process has to wait for the output of the compression. We also assume that
the procedures of compression and encryption (Scomp and ignc) and outputting their
results (Tcamp and T^nc) can be executed in parallel. This allows overlapping of Scomp
and Jenc with Tcomp and r^nc respectively. The values of S^omp and Tcomp may vary with
symbols' probabilities but for the simplicity, we assume that the required time is equal.
In type 1 system, the delay of the output from its input is given by Scomp H" '^comp

¿^enc •

We assume that the time required for X O R is very small and hence, can be ignored.
In Type 2 system, the delay to produce the output from the corresponding input is

Scomp + '''ccmip when Scomp+Tcomp > Senc+Tenc and ignc+Tenc when Scomp+^comp < «^e
So the throughput is determined by the slower of the compression or the encryption.
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1 symbol
Compression input
Tcomp

Compression output
/Encryption input

>comp

Tene

Encryption output

8comp

: delay of the compression output from the input (time required to compress 1 symbol)

X comp

: time for the compression part to produce 1 block output for the encryption part

5enc

: delay of the encryption output from the input (time required to encrypt 1 block)

T enc

: time for the encryption part to produce 1 block output

Figure 6.2: Speed of Type 1 system
1 symbol
Compression input
T comp

Compression output
/Encryption input

»comp

Tene

Encryption output

5 comp

: delay of the compression output from the input (time required to compress 1 symbol)

T comp

: time for the compression part to produce 1 block output for the encryption part

5enc

: delay of the encryption output from the input (time required to encrypt 1 block)

T enc

: time for the encryption part to produce 1 block output

Figure 6.3: Speed of Type 2 system

6.2.2

Security

Both systems are capable of hiding the true output of the compression system. However, Type 2 system has a restriction on the type of the encryption system. Since the
encryption output is XORed with the compressed output, the encryption of Type 2
system is effectively a substitution cipher. When the output of the compression part is
known, the output sequence of the encryption part can be revealed by a plaintext attack. Since the compression system is assumed not to provide any security, an attacker
can easily reproduce the compressed output if an input message is known. Then the sequence produced by the encryption part can be discovered by XORing the reproduced
sequence and the output of Type 2 system. Since a simple pseudo-random generater
is known to be weak, the system cannot provide strong security. In case of Type 1
system, there are more choices for the encryption algorithm. It can be a substitution
cipher, a permutation or a combination of both.
For both systems, the security strength is determined solely by the security of the
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encryption algorithm. Known plaintext or chosen plaintext attacks are possible on
the systems. However, the choice of an input message would be more limited in the
combined compression and encryption system than a system without compression. To
make the compression system produce specific output sequence, it will be necessary to
do a reverse calculation of encoding which involves the parameters such as symbols'
frequencies and the high and low values. So it is more costly to produce a specific
output sequence of symbols in the compression system, and in fact some sequences of
symbols may be simply impossible to produce.

6.3

Pure compression versus compression-encryption
schemes

In both Type 1 and 2 systems, the compression algorithm can be either a pure compression or a compression-encryption scheme. In the following, we look at the benefits
of replacing a pure compression algorithm by a compression-encryption algorithm.

6.3.1

Controlling input messages of encryption algorithm

It will be much more difficult to produce a specific output sequence in a system with a
combined compression-encryption algorithm than with a pure compression algorithm.
This is because there is a considerable number of unknown parameters in the compression part of a compression-encryption system. BH attack may be used to reveal
the parameters but it is more costly. That is, the cost of BH attack to make the parameters known must also be included in the assessment. However, if BH attack is
feasible (in terms of the cost,) the system does not provide strong security. Hence if
the compression-encryption system itself does not provide the resistance against BH
attack, the whole system will not be resistant against BH attack either.

6.3.2

Resistance against statistical attacks

For the encryption part of the system, statistical attacks would become more difficult
because the input to the encryption algorithm is compressed and hence has less redundancy. However, statistical attacks against the compression-encryption part would
work because the model is adaptive and hence reflects the statistical properties of the
input sequence. When the model is simple, ie. models of lower order, if the statistical
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behavior of the source is known, it would not be difficult to estimate the parameters of the model.

Security of the higher order model is still an open problem but

the behavior of the model is more or less the same. In general, in arithmetic coding,
re-synchronizing the system in the middle of transmission is difficult. However, the
difficulty is from communication point of view and not security point of view and even
with extra measure the system still cannot provide enough security.

6.3.3

Efficiency

As long as a lower order model is used, the combined compression and encryption
scheme does not provide strong security. The question to be answered is whether adding
secret parameters into the coder is more efficient, or adding encryption algorithm to
the coder. Taking into account factors such as speed, compression ratio, and flexibility
of the design, with a careful choice of the encryption algorithm, adding encryption
after compression may have numerous benefits. In general regardless of the chosen
approach, the drop in the compression performance should be minimized. Using the
encryption after compression is not limited to arithmetic coding compression but can
be used with any other compression method. Making the two processes separate results
in each algorithm in the system to be simple and less expensive. This also requires
fewer extra-bits in the output which will be only added to the padding of the last block
of the output. The impact on the compression performance, that is, compression ratio
and compression speed, will also be negligible compared to methods such as extranarrowing.

6.4

Conclusion

Lower order models cannot provide strong security. Adding secret parameters to the
coder could improve security but it would impose restrictions on the system.

By

adding encryption algorithm after arithmetic coding encryption schemes, security can
be improved and more flexibility can be obtained. The advantage of this approach is
that it can be used in combination with other compression algorithms.

Chapter 7
Conclusion
Secure compression schemes have various benefits. By achieving compression and security through a single algorithm, less overhead could be expected. In general efficiency
is improved by compressing data before encryption. This goal is also achieved by secure compression schemes. Arithmetic coding is an optimal coding scheme. If it can
also provide security the benefits are achieved. Adaptive arithmetic coding encryption
schemes have a large key space (initial model), and it is difficult to re-gain the synchronization in the middle of the transmission. These properties make them attractive
for providing security.
We had a careful study of the arithmetic coding encryption schemes and demonstrated various attacks. We proposed a number of protection mechanisms and looked
at their security. In this chapter, first we summarize the schemes and then review the
attacks. Next we comment on the weaknesses of the schemes and their security, and
conclude with some final remarks.

7.1

Schemes

The schemes are divided into two classes : model-based schemes which use the model
as the secret, and coder-based schemes in which additional secret parameters are used
to strengthen the security of the coder. The two classes can be combined together. The
secret key of a model-based arithmetic coding encryption scheme is the initial model
which may be explicitly given as a key or may be the result of updating by the initial
string. An attack against the schemes may try to discover the key, ie. the initial model,
or try to gain synchronization in the middle of the transmission without finding the
key. As the attacks show, both approaches are valid.

7.2. Attacks
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Attacks

BH attack shows that it is easy to reduce the key space by a chosen plaintext attack
when the order of the model is low. We showed that the output of the encoder leaks
much more information than expected. The average output length per symbol can
give information about halving points. When the model is known, it is easy to discover
coder's parameters, ie. the high and low values, from encoder's output and analyzing
encoder's output as a value, is useful in some attacks. The output obtained by encoding
a symbol at the bottom of the frequency table leaks the information about the low value.
Some of the attacks use the property that the encoding/decoding calculation for each
symbol is simple although the calculation of a whole message will include high order
parameters. In the calculation, only five parameters are involved, ie. the upper and
lower cumulative frequencies of a symbol, the total cumulative frequency, and the high
and low values.

7.3

Weaknesses and security

One of the weaknesses of the schemes is the adaptiveness of the model. Since the
model is updated as to follow the distribution of symbols in a message, it can be
manipulated by an input message. This can be exploited by statistical attacks when
distribution of the source is known. Using the higher order model may be one way
to improving security. As shown in [Irv95], BH attack will require a much longer
message to synchronize the model and hence it becomes more impractical. However,
the level of security against BH attack and other statistical attacks is still unknown.
Also the disadvantage of the higher order model is its memory requirement. Lower
order models will achieve less compression compared to the higher order models but
its smaller memory requirement could be attractive for various applications.
If the model cannot provide strong security, the security of the system has to rely
on the coder. The coder has little security without any additional mechanism and so
the coder-based schemes use additional mechanisms. As shown in the attack, known
coder-based schemes do not provide strong security. Adding other secret parameters
to the coder may strengthen the security but they would impose restrictions on the
design.
Adding encryption algorithms such as XORing with a pseudo-random generator and
a permutation can be a better choice. It will give much flexibility in the design and it
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can be also used with other types of compression systems. Also compared to the modelbased schemes a better resistance against statistical attacks can be expected.

The

adaptive model itself would not have strong resistance against statistical attacks due
to its adaptive nature. However, the additional encryption algorithm after combined
encryption and compression, will have an input with less redundancy (compressed by
the encoder), and so it has the advantage against the attacks. To achieve a certain level
of security, encryption after a combined compression and encryption system will require
less security than the encryption after a compression only system. The important point
for the added encryption system is that the compressor and the encryption algorithm
should be indivisible. Otherwise the encryption part can be independently attacked.

7.4

Further work

As we mentioned above, the security of arithmetic coding encryption schemes with the
higher order model is an open problem. There are several questions to be answered
such as whether or not it is possible to improve BH attack so as to reduce the message
size required to over-flood the model, and how much resistant against statistical attacks
the model is. There are different types of higher order models such as PPMA [Irv95],
P P M Z and PPM* [Blo98] which have different properties [Irv95]. Then an interesting
question would be whether or not it is possible to design a model which takes the
security into account.
To choose an initial model, it is generally said that the model is randomly chosen.
However the conditions that the random model must satisfy are not described in details.
For example, when the frequency of each symbol is uniformly chosen from the values
between 1 and 10 then the cardinality of the set of symbols that have the same frequency
is roughly the same for all values from 1 to 10. Then two models initialized in this
way will have the same frequency sets but different order of symbols. For such models,
discovering the order is easy by a plaintext attack. For example, when A is encoded
and the result of attacker's decoder is X, by replacing X by A, it is possible to correct
the order of symbols. In this case, the order of symbols does not provide any security.
This means that to design a practically secure system, much more details of the system
must be examined.
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Appendix A
Finding the high and low values of the
coder

A.l

Experiment

In this experiment the method described in Section 4.1.2 is used.
The original compressed data was produced using a message "Test message" and
the high and low values 54321 (0xd431) and 12345 (0x3039) respectively. Then 0 was
set to the low value and the high value was changed from 32769 to 65535, one at a
time, and in each case the encoder's output was compared with the original output.
The experiment was run on Pentium 150 MHz machine with 32M bytes memory, with
Linux OS.
We found more than one possible high values. For example, the correct pair is
(54321, 12345) but also the pairs (54225, 12540) and (54353, 12279) can correctly
decode the message. There may be more than one pair of high and low values which
can correctly decode.

A.2

Result of the experiment

### message = "Test message"
low

= 12345 (0x3039)

high

= 54321 (0xd431)

range = 41976 (0xa3f8)
### low

= 0 (0x0000)

range = 32769 (0x8001)
increment by 1 (0x0001)
while high <= 65535 (Oxffff)
### ( 1)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

high = 41685 (0xa2d5)
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6d 5c 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 f c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### ( 2)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 41688 (0xa2d8)

6d 5e 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 f a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### ( 3)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 41691 (0xa2db)

6d 60 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 f 8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### ( 4)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 41834 (0xa36a)

6d cO 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 98 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### ( 5)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 41836 (0xa36c)

6d c l 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 97 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### ( 6)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

high = 41837 (0xa36d)

6d c2 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 96 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### ( 7 )

low

= 0 (0x0000)

high = 41839 ( 0 x a 3 6 f )

6d c3 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 95 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### ( 8)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 41840 (0xa370)

6d c4 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 94 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### ( 9)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 41841 ( 0 x a 3 7 l )

6d c5 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 93 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
###

(10)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

high = 41842 (0xa372)

6d c5 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 93 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
###

(11)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

high = 41843 (0xa373)

6d c6 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 92 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
###

(12)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

high = 41844 (0xa374)

6d c7 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 91 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
###

(13)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

high = 41845 (0xa375)

6d c7 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 91 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
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low

== 0 (0x0000)
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h i g h = 41846 (0xa376)

6d c8 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 90 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
###

(15)

low

== 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 41847 (0xa377)

6d c9 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 8 f 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
###

(16)

low

== 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 41848 (0xa378)

6d c9 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 8f 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
###

(17)

low

== 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 41849 (0xa379)

6d c a 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 Be 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
###

(18)

low

== 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 41850 (0xa37a)

6d cb 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 8d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
###

(19)

low

== 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 41851 (0xa37b)

6d cb 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 8d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
###

(20)

low

== 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 41852 (0xa37c)

6d c c 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 8c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
###

(21)

low

== 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 41853 (Oxa37d)

6d cd 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 8b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
###

(22)

low

:= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 41854 (Oxa37e)

6d cd 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 8b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
###

(23)

low

== 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 41855 (Oxa37f)

6d c e 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 8a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
###

(24)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 41856 (0xa380)

44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48

6d c f

30 89 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
###

(25)

6d c f

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 41857 ( 0 x a 3 8 l )

44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48

30 89 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
###

(26)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 41858 (0xa382)

6d dO 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
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30 88 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### ( 2 7 )

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 41859

(0xa383)

6d d l 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 87 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### ( 2 8 )

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 41860

(0xa384)

6d d l 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 87 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### ( 2 9 )

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 41861

(0xa385)

6d d2 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 86 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### ( 3 0 )

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 41862

(0xa386)

6d d3 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 85 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### ( 3 1 )

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 41863

(0xa387)

6d d3 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 85 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### ( 3 2 )

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 41864 (0xa388)

6d d4 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 84 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### ( 3 3 )

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 41865

(0xa389)

6d d5 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 83 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### ( 3 4 )

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 41866

(0xa38a)

6d d5 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 83 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### ( 3 5 )

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 41867

(0xa38b)

6d d6 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 82 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### ( 3 6 )

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 41868

(0xa38c)

6d d7 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### ( 3 7 )

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 41869

(0xa38d)

6d d7 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### ( 3 8 )

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 41870

(0xa38e)

6d d8 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### ( 3 9 )

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 41871 ( 0 x a 3 8 f )
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6d d9 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 7f 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### (40)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

high = 41872 (0xa390)

6d d9 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 7f 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### (41)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

high = 41873 (0xa39l)

6d da 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 7e 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### (42)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

high = 41874 (0xa392)

6d db 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 7d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### (43)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

high = 41875 (0xa393)

6d db 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 7d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### (44)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

high = 41876 (0xa394)

6d dc 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 7c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### (45)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

high = 41877 (0xa395)

6d dd 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 7b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### (46)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

high = 41878 (0xa396)

6d dd 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 7b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### (47)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

high = 41879 (0xa397)

6d de 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 7a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### (48)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

high = 41880 (0xa398)

6d df 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 79 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### (49)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

high = 41881 (0xa399)

6d df 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 79 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### (50)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

high = 41882 (0xa39a)

6d eO 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 78 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### (51)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

high = 41883 (0xa39b)

6d e l 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 77 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
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###

(52)

low

= 0 (0x0000)
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h i g h = 41884 ( 0 x a 3 9 c )

6d e l 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 77 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
###

(53)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 42025 (0xa429)

6e 40 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 18 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
###

(54)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 42026 (0xa42a)

6e 41 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 17 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
###

(55)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 42028 ( 0 x a 4 2 c )

6e 42 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 16 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
###

(56)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 42029 (0xa42d)

6e 43 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 15 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
###

(57)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 42031 ( 0 x a 4 2 f )

6e 44 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 14 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
###

(58)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 42032 (0xa430)

6e 45 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 13 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
###

(59)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 42034 (0xa432)

6e 46 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 12 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
###

(60)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 42035 (0xa433)

6e 47 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 11 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
###

(61)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 42037 (0xa435)

6e 48 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
###

(62)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 42038 (0xa436)

6e 49 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 Of 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
###

(63)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 42040 (0xa438)

6e 4a 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
30 Oe 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
###

(64)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

h i g h = 42041 (0xa439)

6e 4b 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48
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30 Od 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### (65)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

high = 42043 (0xa43b)

6e 4c 44 86 ae 14 fc d4 64 f7 09 68 48
30 Oc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### (66)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

high = 42044 (0xa43c)

6e 4d 44 86 ae 14 fc d4 64 f7 09 68 48
30 Ob 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### (67)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

high = 42047 (Oxa43f)

6e 4f 44 86 ae 14 fc d4 64 f7 09 68 48
30 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### (68)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

high = 42050 (Oxa442)

6e 51 44 86 ae 14 fc d4 64 f7 09 68 48
30 07 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### (69)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

high = 42053 (0xa445)

6e 53 44 86 ae 14 fc d4 64 f7 09 68 48
30 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### (70)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

high = 42056 (0xa448)

6e 55 44 86 ae 14 fc d4 64 f7 09 68 48
30 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### (71)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

high = 42059 (0xa44b)

6e 57 44 86 ae 14 fc d4 64 f7 09 68 48
30 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### (72)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

high = 42062 (0xa44e)

6e 59 44 86 ae 14 fc d4 64 f7 09 68 48
2f ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### (73)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

high = 42065 (0xa45l)

6e 5b 44 86 ae 14 fc d4 64 f7 09 68 48
2f fd 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### (74)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

high = 42068 (0xa454)

6e 5d 44 86 ae 14 fc d4 64 f7 09 68 48
2f fb 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### (75)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

high = 42071 (0xa457)

6e 5f 44 86 ae 14 fc d4 64 f7 09 68 48
2f f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
### (76)

low

= 0 (0x0000)

high = 42074 (0xa45a)

6e 61 44 86 ae 14 fc d4 64 f7 09 68 48
2f f7 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
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A.3.1

shell script

#!/biii/sh

TXT="Test message"
CNT=0
0RGL=12345
0RGH=54321
BASE=0
WIDTH='expr ${ORGH} - ${ORGL}'
RANGE='expr 65539 / 2'
MAXHIGH=65535
INC=1

echo "### message = \"${TXT}\""
printf "

low

= Id (0x7.04x)\n" $"CORGL> ${ORGL>

printf "

high

= Id (0xy.04x)\ii" ${ORGH> ${ORGH>

printf "

range = V.d (0xy.04x)\n" ${WIDTH} ${WIDTH}

echo -n "${1X1}" >orgtxt
adaptive .encode 0 $-CORGL} $-CORGH> <orgtxt 2>/dev/null >orgdat
../tool/hexdsp <orgdat >hexdat

printf "### low

= y.d (0xy.04x)\n" ${BASE} ${BASE>

printf "

range = y.d (0xy.04x)\n" ${RANGE> $-CRANGE>

printf "

increment by y.d (0xy.04x)\n" ${INC> $-ClNC}

printf "

while high <= y.d (0xy.04x)\n" ${MAXHIGH} ${MAXHIGH>

LDW=${BASE}
HIGH='expr $-CBASE> + ${RANGE}'

while C $-CHIGH> -le $-CMAXHIGH} ]
do
adaptive.encode 0 ${LOW} $-CHIGH} <orgtxt 2>/dev/null I ../tool/hexdsp >temp
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N E W L O W = ' . . / t o o l / h e x d i f f hexdat t e m p 2>datl'
if

[ $? = 1 ]

then
C N T = ' e x p r $ { C N T } + 1'
p r i n t f "### (y.2d)" ${CNT}
printf "

low

= y.d (0xy.04x)" ${LDW} $-CLDW}

printf "

h i g h = V.d (0xy.04x)\n" ${HIGH} ${HIGH>

cat t e m p
cat d a t l
N E W H I G H = ' e x p r $ { N E W L D W } + ${HIGH}'
adaptive_decode 0 \
$ { N E W L D W } $ { N E W H I G H } 2 > / d e v / n u l l <orgdat >cmptxt 2>/dev/niill
d i f f orgtxt cmptxt
fi
R A N G E = ' e x p r $ { R A N G E } + ${INC>'
H I G H = ' e x p r $ { B A S E > + ${RANGE}'
done

A.3.2

hexdsp.c

#include

<stdio.h>

#include

<miistd.h>

#include

<stdlib.h>

/*
* R e v e r s e the b i t s in the output.
*/
int
r e v e r s e ( i n t val)
"C
int cnt;
int r e t ;

f o r (cnt = 0, ret = 0; cnt < 8; cnt++) {
ret « =
ret

1;

1= v a l & 1;
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1;

>
return ret;

}
int
mainO
{
int ch;
int val;

while ((ch = g e t c h a r O ) != EOF) {
val = reverse(ch);

/* reverse bits. */

printf ("y.02x

/* print a byte in h e x . */

val & OxOff) ;

>
putcharC ' \ n O ;

return 0;

}

A.3.3

hexdiff.c

#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <memory.h>

/*
* Input two f i l e s , each of which contains a number in hex format
* and calculate the difference of the two numbers.
* Print the difference to stderr
* and print the MSB 16 bits of the difference to stdout.
* The exit code is 1 when 17th and the following bits are 0.
* Otherwise, the exit code is 0 .
*/
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int
mainCint argc, char* argvC])
{
FILE* fpl;

/* file 1 */

FILE* fp2;

/* file 2 */

int Chi [4096]
int ch2C4096]
int val[4096]
int cntl, cnt2;
int flgl, flg2;
int ov;
int ret;

if (argc != 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: hexdiff filel file2\n");
return 1;

}
/* open files. */
fpl = fopenCargvCl], "r") ;
fp2 = fopen(argvC2], "r");
if (fpl == NULL 1 I fp2 == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "cannot open file\n");
return 1;

}
/* read two numbers in the files. */
ineraset(chl, 0, sizeof (chl) ) ;
memset(ch2, 0, sizeof(ch2));
flgl = flg2 = 1;
cntl = cnt2 = 0;
while (fscanf(fpl, "V.x", &chl[cntl]) == 1) {
chl[cntl] &= OxOff; /* must be 2 digits */
cntl++;

}
while

(fscanf(fp2, "V.x", &ch2[cnt2]) == 1) {

ch2[cnt2] &= OxOff; /* must be 2 digits */
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ciit2++;

}
/*

close

files.

*/

f c l o s e ( f p l ) ;
f c l o s e ( f p 2 ) ;

/*

adjust
if

/*

the

p r e c i s i o n

(enti

<

cnt2)

enti

=

cnt2;

calculate
cnt2
ov

=

=

the

(length)

difference

of

2

of

the

numbers.

numbers.

*/

enti;

0;

w h i l e

(enti

>

0)

{

e n t i — ;
vai[enti]
if

=

ehi[enti]

(vai[enti]
ov

=

<

0)

-

eh2[entl]

-

{

1;

vai[enti]

+=

0x100;

}
else
ov

=

0;

}
/*

p r i n t

the

difference.

ret

-

f o r

(enti

*/

1;
=

0;

enti

f p r i n t f ( s t d e r r ,
if

(enti
ret

>=
=

2

<

cnt2;

entl++)

"•/.02x

&&

{

val[entl]);

vai[enti]

!=

0)

0;

}
f p u t c ( ' \ n ' ,

/*

p r i n t

M S B

16

stderr);

b i t s

printf('"/.dXn",

r e t u r n
}

ret;

of

the

val[0]

*

difference.
256

+

*/

val[l]);

ov;

*/

Appendix B
Calculation of bits/symbol
The average bits/symbol for each n symbols can be used to detect halving points
(4.1.1). It would be easier to detect halving points by smoothing the change in the
average by calculating the average of consecutive j values. The example is shown as
follows.
The calculation of the average is
(B.l)

J

where Vi is the bits/symbol of the ith block. The following graph shows the bits/symbol
using the above calculation with j = 3, 5, 7 and 9.
bitVsYm

halving

halving

halving

Figure B.l: Smoothing of the bits/symbol values

Appendix C
Finding lower shrinking factors of the
combined scheme

C.l

The experiment

We conducted an attack on the LFB combined scheme (4.2)
All the frequencies of the initial model is set to 1. Whether or not the model is
randomly chosen is not important in this attack because the attack does not try to
discover the initial model and so the initial model does not have any influence on the
attack. The attack starts in a part of the output where the symbols at the bottom of
the frequency table are encoded.
The parameters used in the experiment are as follows.
• initial low value = 0x1234
• initial high value = 0xDBA9
• lower shrink factor 0 = 349
• upper shrink factor 0 = 9124
• lower shrink factor 1 = 541
• upper shrink factor 1 = 9978
• 128 bit random sequence = 0x714556410728AD711B16755967F8EE7C
After sampling the output of the encoder, a program which tries to find the lower
shrinking factors, analyzed the output. The result of the experiment is shown in the
next section.

C.2.

The result of the experiment

C.2
Bit

The result of the experiment
0 (00100011011101110000100011110010)

sh high 9000
sh high 9500
sh high 9999
Bit

1 (01000110111011100001000111100100)

sh high 9000
sh low( 541) bits : org(OOOOllOlllOlllOO) tst(010001101110111)
mid-range buf : before(1) after(0)
see Bit 16
sh high 9500
sh low( 541) bits : org(OOOOllOlllOlllOO) tst(010001101110111)
mid-range buf : before(1) after(O)
see Bit 16
sh high 9999
sh low( 541) bits : org(OOOOllOlllOlllOO) tst(010001101110111)
mid-range buf : before(l) after(O)
see Bit 16
Bit

3

(00011011101110000100011110010001)

sh high 9000
sh high 9500
sh high 9999
Bit

4 (00110111011100001000111100100010)

sh high 9000
sh high 9500
sh high 9999
Bit

5 (01101110111000010001111001000100)

sh high 9000
sh high 9500
sh high 9999
Bit

8 (01110111000010001111001000110111)

sh high 9000
sh high 9500
sh high 9999
Bit 12 (01110000100011110010001101110111)
sh high 9000
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sh high 9500
sh high 9999
Bit 16

(00001000111100100011011101110000)

sh high 9000
sh low( 349) bits
mid-range buf

org(OOOOlOOOllllOOlO) tst(OOOOlOOOllllO)
before(0) after(l)

see Bit 29
sh high 9500
sh low( 349) bits
mid-range buf

org(OOOOlOOOllllOOlO) tst(OOOOlOOOllllO)
before(0) after(l)

see Bit 29
sh high 9999
sh low( 349) bits
mid-range buf

org(OOOOlOOOllllOOlO) tst(OOOOlOOOllllO)
before(0) after(l)

see Bit 29
Bit 17

(00010001111001000110111011100000)

sh high 9000
sh high 9500
sh high 9999
Bit 18

(00100011110010001101110111000000)

sh high 9000
sh high 9500
sh high 9999
Bit 19

(01000111100100011011101110000000)

sh high 9000
sh low( 788) bits
mid-range buf

org(OOOOllllOOlOOOll) tst(OlOOOllllOOlOO)
before(1) after(l)

see Bit 33
sh high 9500
sh low( 788) bits
mid-range buf

org(OOOOllllOOlOOOll) tst(OlOOOllllOOlOO)
before(1) after(l)

see Bit 33
sh high 9999
sh low( 788) bits
mid-range buf

org(OOOOllllOOlOOOll) tst(OlOOOllllOOlOO)
before(1) after(l)

see Bit 33
Bit 21

(00011110010001101110111000011011)

sh high 9000
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sh h i g h 9500
sh h i g h 9999
Bit 22

(00111100100011011101110000110110)

sh high 9000
sh h i g h 9500
sh h i g h 9999
Bit 23

(01111001000110111011100001101100)

sh h i g h 9000
sh low( 923) bits
mid-range buf

org(OOOlOOOllOlllOll) tst(01111001000110111)
before(4) after(l)

see Bit 40
sh low( 692) bits
mid-range buf

org(OOOlOOOllOlllOll) tst(01111001000110111)
before(4) after(l)

see Bit 40
sh high 9500
sh low( 923) bits
mid-range buf

org(OOOlOOOllOlllOll) tst(01111001000110111)
before(4) after(l)

see Bit 40
sh low( 692) bits
mid-range buf

org(OOOlOOOllOlllOll) tst(01111001000110111)
before(4) after(l)

see Bit 40
sh high 9999
sh low( 923) bits
mid-range buf

org(OOOlOOOllOlllOll) tst (01111001000110111)
before(4) after(l)

see Bit 40
sh low( 692) bits
mid-range buf

org(OOOlOOOllOlllOll) tst (01111001000110111)
before(4) after(1)

see Bit 40
Bit 28

(00100011011101110000110111011100)

sh h i g h 9000
sh high 9500
sh high 9999
Bit 29

(01000110111011100001101110111000)

sh high 9000
sh low( 541) bits : org(OOOOllOlllOlllOO)
mid-range buf
see Bit 44
sh high 9500

: before(1) after(O)

tst(OlOOOllOlllOlll)

C.2.
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sh low( 541) bits : org(OOOOllOlllOlllOO)
mid-range buf
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tst(010001101110111)

: before(1) after(O)

see Bit 44
sh high 9999
sh low( 541) bits : org(OOOOllOlllOlllOO) tst(OlOOOllOlllOlll)
mid-range buf

: before(1) after(O)

see Bit 44
Bit 31

(00011011101110000110111011100001)

sh high 9000
sh high 9500
sh high 9999
Bit 32

(00110111011100001101110111000010)

sh high 9000
sh high 9500
sh high 9999
Bit 33

(01101110111000011011101110000100)

sh high 9000
sh high 9500
sh high 9999
Bit 36

(01110111000011011101110000110111)

sh high 9000
sh high 9500
sh high 9999
Bit 40

(01110000110111011100001101110111)

sh high 9000
sh high 9500
sh high 9999
Bit 44

(00001101110111000011011101110000)

sh high 9000
sh low( 541) bits : org(OOOOllOlllOlllOO) tst(00001101110111)
mid-range buf

: before(0) after(0)

see Bit 58
sh high 9500
sh low( 541) bits : org(OOOOllOlllOlllOO) tst(00001101110111)
mid-range buf

: before(0) after(0)

see Bit 58
sh high 9999
sh low( 541) bits : org(OOOOllOlllOlllOO) tst(OOOOllOlllOlll)
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mid-range buf : before(0) after(O)
see B i t 58
B i t 45

(00011011101110000110111011100000)

s h high. 9 0 0 0
sh h i g h 9500
sh h i g h 9999
B i t 46

(00110111011100001101110111000000)

sh h i g h 9000
sh h i g h 9500
sh h i g h 9999
B i t 47

(01101110111000011011101110000000)

sh h i g h 9000
sh h i g h 9500
sh h i g h 9999
B i t 50

(01110111000011011101110000100011)

sh h i g h 9000
sh h i g h 9500
sh h i g h 9999

Firstly, at B i t 1, one shrinking factor was detected. The next output should start
at Bit 16, as the comment in the program output indicates. The next shrinking
factor was actually detected there. At Bit 19, another shrinking factor was detected.
However, the next output should have started at Bit 33 but no shrinking factor was
detected at that point. Hence, this was a wrong detection.
As can be seen, two lower shrinking factors were correctly detected by the program.
The program did not find the upper shrinking factors and 3 different upper shrinking
factors were used. However, the influence of the upper shrinking factors are small and
so it is possible to correctly obtain the lower shrinking factors.

Appendix D
Source code for the LFB combined scheme

D.l

Implementation of LFB combined scheme

We implemented the LFB combined scheme based on W N C implementation . The
program was not developed for the practical use but only for the experiment. Since
the program was to be used to examine the resistance against BH attack, the features
such as 16 bit substitution and randomly chosen initial model which are irrelevant for
the experiment, are omitted.
The key is given by a file in text format. They are as follows.
• shrinking factor 0 (low)
• shrinking factor 0 (high)
• shrinking factor 1 (low)
• shrinking factor 1 (high)
• random 128 bits
The list only includes the new codes and the source files which were modified from
the original W N C implementation .

D.2
D.2.1

Source list
encode.c

/* M A I N P R O G R A M F O R E N C O D I N G . */

#include <stdio.h>
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#iiiclude <stdlib.h>
#include "model.h"
#iiiclude "arithinetic_codiiig.h"
#iiiclude "secret.h"

int
mainCint argc, char* argv[])
{
if (argc != 3) -C
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: adaptive_encode low high \ii");
return 1;

}
initsecret();
start_model(); /* Set up other modules.

*/

St art _output iiig_bits 0 ;
start_encodiiig(atol(argv[l] ) , atol(argv[2] ) ) ;
for (;;) { /* Loop through characters. */
int ch; int symbol;
ch = getc(stdin); /* Read the next character. */
if (ch==EDF) break; /* Exit loop on end-of-file.*/
symbol = char_to_indexCch] ; /* Translate to an index.

*/

encode_symbol(symbol,cum_freq); /* Encode that symbol.
update_model(symbol); /* Update the model.

*/

*/

>
encode_symbol(EOF_symbol,cum_freq); /* Encode the EOF symbol.
done_encoding() ; /* Send the last few bits.
done_outputing_bits();
exit(O);

D.2.2

decode.c

/* MAIN PROGRAM FOR DECODING. */

#include <stdio.h>
#include "model.h"

*/

*/
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"arithmetic_coding.li"

ttinclude "secret.h"

int
mainCint argc, char* argv[])
{
if (argc != 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: adaptive_decode low high \ii");
return 1;

}
initsecret0;
start_inodel() ; /* Set up other modules.

*/

start_inputing_bits();
start_decoding(atol(argv[l]),

atol(argv[2]));

for (;;) { /* Loop through characters. */
int ch; int symbol;
symbol = decode_symbol(cum_freq); /* Decode next symbol.

*/

if (symbol==EDF_symbol) break; /* Exit loop if EOF symbol. */
ch = index_to_char[symbol]; /* Translate to a character.*/
putc(ch,stdout); /* Write that character.

*/

update_model(symbol) ; /* Update the model.

*/

}
exit(O) ;

D . 2.3

ar it h m e t ic _enco de. c

/* ARITHMETIC ENCODING ALGORITHM. */

#include <stdio.h>

#include

"arithmetic_coding.h"

#include

"parameter.h"

#include "secret.h"

static void bit_plus_follow(); /* Routine that follows

*/
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/* CURRENT STATE OF THE ENCODING. */

static code_value low, high; /* Ends of the current code region

*/

static long bits_to_follow; /* Number of opposite bits to output after
/* the next bit.

*/

*/

/* START ENCODING A STREAM OF SYMBOLS. */

start_encoding(code_value 1, code_value h)
{

low = 1; /* Full code range.

*/

high = h;
bits_to_follow = 0; /* No bits to follow next.

*/

}
/* ENCODE A SYMBOL. */

encode_symbol(symbol,cum.freq)
int symbol; /* Symbol to encode

*/

int cu2n_freq[] ; /* Cumulative symbol frequencies
{

*/

long range; /* Size of the current code region

*/

range = (long)(high-low)+1;
high = low + /* Narrow the code region

*/

(range*cum_freqCsymbol-l])/cum_freq[0]-l; /* to that allotted to this */
low = low +

/* symbol.

*/

(range*cum_freqCsymbol])/cum_freq[0] ;
for (;;) { /* Loop to output bits.

*/

if (high<Half) {
bit_plus_follow(0); /* Output 0 if in low half. */

}
else if (low>=Half) { /* Output 1 if in high half.*/
bit_plus_follow(l);
low -= Half;
high -= Half; /* Subtract offset to top.

*/

}
else if (low>=First_qtr /* Output an opposite bit

*/

&& high<Third_qtr) { /* later if in middle half. */
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bits_to_follow += 1;
low -= First_qtr; /* Subtract offset to middle*/
h i g h -= First_qtr;

}
else b r e a k ; /* Otherwise exit l o o p .

*/

low = 2*low;
h i g h = 2*high+l; /* Scale u p code r a n g e .

*/

>
range =

(long)(high-low)+1;

h i g h = low + range * SHRINK.VALH / 10000;
low = low + range * SHRINK.VALL / 10000;
nextsecret();

/* F I N I S H E N C O D I N G T H E STREAM. */

done_encoding()
{

b i t s _ t o _ f o l l o w + = 1 ; /* Output two bits that

*/

if (low<First_qtr) bit_plus_follow(0); /* select the quarter that
else b i t _ p l u s _ f o l l o w ( l ) ; /* the current code range
} /* c o n t a i n s .

*/

*/

/* O U T P U T BITS PLUS FOLLOWING OPPOSITE B I T S . */

static v o i d bit_plus_follow(bit)
int b i t ;
{

output_bit(bit); /* Output the b i t .

*/

while (bits_to_follow>0) {
output_bit(!bit); /* Output bits_to_follow
b i t s _ t o _ f o l l o w -= 1; /* opposite b i t s . Set
} /* b i t s _ t o _ f o l l o w to z e r o .

D.2.4

*/

arithmetic_decode.c

*/
*/

*/
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/* A R I T H M E T I C D E C O D I N G ALGORITHM. */

#include <stdio.h>

#iiiclude "aritlimetic_coding.h"
#include "parameter.h"
#include "secret.h"

/* C U R R E N T STATE OF T H E D E C O D I N G . */

static code_value value; /* Currently-seen code value

*/

static code_value l o w , high; /* Ends of current code region

*/

/* START D E C O D I N G A STREAM OF SYMBOLS. */

start_decoding(code_value 1 , code_value h )
{

int i;
value = 0; /* Input bits to f i l l the

*/

f o r (i = 1; i<=Code_value_bits; i++) { /* code v a l u e .

*/

value = 2*value+input_bit();

}
low = 1;
h i g h = h;

/* D E C O D E T H E N E X T S Y M B O L . */

int d e c o d e _ s y m b o l (cuin_freq)
int cui[i_freq[] ; /* Cumulative s y m b o l frequencies
{

*/

long r a n g e ; /* Size of current code region
int cum; /* Cumulative frequency calculated
int symbol; /* S y m b o l decoded
range =
cum =

(long)(high-low)+1;
/* F i n d cum f r e q f o r v a l u e . */

(((long)(value-low)+1)*cum_freq[0]-l)/range ;

*/
*/
*/
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f o r ( s y m b o l = 1; cum.freq[symbol]>cum; symbol++) ; /* T h e n f i n d s y m b o l . */
high. = low + /* Narrow the code region

*/

(range*cum_freqCsymbol-l])/cum_freq[0]-l; /* to that allotted to this */
low = low +

/* s y m b o l .

*/

(range*cum_freq [symbol])/cum_freq[0] ;
f o r (;;) { /* Loop to get rid of b i t s . */
if (high<Half) {
/* n o t h i n g */ /* Expand low h a l f .

*/

}
else if (low>=Half) { /* Expand h i g h h a l f .

*/

value -= Half;
low -= Half; /* Subtract offset to t o p .

*/

h i g h -= Half;

}
else if (low>=First_qtr /* Expand middle h a l f .

*/

&& high<Third_qtr) {
value -= First_qtr;
low -= First_qtr; /* Subtract offset to middle*/
h i g h -= First_qtr;

}
else b r e a k ; /* Otherwise exit l o o p .

*/

low = 2*low;
h i g h = 2*high+l; /* Scale up code r a n g e .

*/

value = 2 * v a l u e + i n p u t _ b i t 0 ; /* Move in next input b i t .

}
range =

(long)(high-low)+1;

h i g h = low + range * SHRINK.VALH / 10000;
low = low + range * SHRINK.VALL / 10000;
nextsecret();
r e t u r n symbol;

>

D.2.5

secret.h
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* pann list
*

1 initial low value

*

2 initial high value

*

3 shrinking factor 0 (low)

*

4 shrinking factor 0 (high)

*

5 shrinking factor 1 (low)

*

6 shrinking factor 1 (high)

*

7 random 128 bits

*/

#define SHRINK.LDW 0
#define SHRINK.HIGH 1

#define SHRINK.VALL \
(g_shrink[(g_randbit [g_posrandbyte] »

g.posrandbit) & 1] [SHRINK.LDW] )

#define SHRINK.VALH \
(g_shrinkC(g_randbit [g_posrandbyte] »

#ifdef SECRET
long g_shrink[2][2];
unsigned char g_randbit[16];
int g_posrandbit;
int g_posrandbyte;
#else
extern long g_shrink[2][2];
extern unsigned char g_randbit[16] ;
extern int g_posrandbit;
extern int g.posrandbyte;
extern void initsecret();
extern void nextsecret();
extern void printsecret(FILE* fp) ;
#endif

D.2.6

secret.c

#include <stdio.h>

g.posrandbit) & 1] [SHRINK_HIGH])
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#iiiclude <stdlib.h>

#define SECRET
#iiiclude "secret.h"
#uiidef SECRET

void initsecretO
{
FILE* fp;
int cnt;
char val[3];
char buf[256];

fp = fopenC'secret", "r") ;
if (fp == NULL) {
perrorCcannot open secret file");
exit(l);

}
/* shrink-0 low */
fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp) ;
g_shrink[0]CSHRINK.LOW] = atol(buf);
/* shrink-0 high */
fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp);
g_shrink[0][SHRINK.HIGH] = atol(buf);
/* shrink-1 low */
fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp);
g.shrinkCl][SHRINK.LOW] = atol(buf);
/* shrink-1 high */
fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp);
g.shrinkCl][SHRINK.HIGH] = atol(buf);
/* random 128 bit sequence */
fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp);
val[2] =
for (cnt = 0; cnt < 16; cnt++) {
val [0] = buf[cnt * 2];
val[1] = buf[cnt * 2 + 1] ;
g_randbit [cnt] = strtol(val, NULL, 16);

}
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g.posrandbit = 7;
g.posrandbyte = 0;

fclose(fp);

return;

}
void
nextsecret()
{
g_posraiidbit—;
if (g_posraiidbit < 0) {
g_posraiidbit = 7;
g_posraiidbyte++;
if (g.posrandbyte == 16)
g_posrandbyte = 0;

>
}
void printsecret(FILE* fp)
{
int cnt;

fprintfCfp, "sO-l:y.ld\n", g_shriiik[0] [SHRINK.LDW] ) ;
fprintfCfp, "sO-h:'/.ld\ii", g.shrinkCO] [SHRINK.HIGH] ) ;
fprintfCfp, "sl-l:y.ld\n", g.shrink [l] [SHRINK.LDW] ) ;
fprintfCfp, "sl-h:7.1d\n", g_shrink[l] [SHRINK.HIGH] ) ;
fprintfCfp, "rand:");
for Cent = 0; cnt < sizeof Cg_randbit) ; cnt++)
fprintfCfp, "•/.02x ", g.randbit [cnt] & OxOff) ;
fprintfCfp, "\n");
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